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Abstract 
Search and Rescue (SAR) and disembarkation of persons in distress at sea in the Mediterranean 
continue to fuel divisions among EU member states. The ‘closed ports’ policy declared by the 
Italian Ministry of Interior in June 2018, and the ensuing refusal to let NGO ships conducting 
SAR operations enter Italian ports, has resulted in unresolved diplomatic rows between some 
European governments and EU institutions, and grave violations of the human rights of people 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean.  
This paper examines how current political controversies surrounding SAR and disembarkation 
in the Mediterranean unfold in a policy context characterised by a ‘contained mobility’ 
paradigm that has materialised in the increasing penalisation of humanitarian SAR NGOs, a 
strategic and gradual operational disengagement from SAR activities by the EU and its member 
states, and the delegation of containment tasks to the Libyan coast guard (so-called ‘pullbacks’), 
a development that has been indirectly supported by EU institutions. These policies have 
contributed to substantially widen the gap in SAR capabilities in the Central Mediterranean.  
  
The paper challenges the assumption that national governments and EU institutions can bypass 
their rule of law and human rights responsibilities under international maritime, human rights 
and refugee law, as well as those laid down in EU Treaties and national constitutional laws. It 
argues that despite the many barriers to ensuring effective remedies for the affected 
individuals, the notion of ‘portable justice’ has the potential to capture EU and national agent 
responsibilities and liabilities for human rights violations in the Mediterranean and crimes 
against humanity in Libya.  
Since the summer of 2018, a number of cases of disembarkations following NGO SAR 
operations have been addressed through ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements 
from Italy and Malta, involving a limited number of member states on a voluntary and secretive 
basis. The paper provides a first critical examination of these ‘arrangements’ and shows how, 
since the beginning of 2019, the European Commission and EU agencies (Frontex and EASO) 
have assisted in the implementation of these ‘extra-EU Treaty’ arrangements. This paper argues 
that the use of solidarity ‘à la carte’ or ‘variable geometry’ in asylum policies takes 
Europeanisation backwards, allows for a ‘cherry picking’ approach by EU governments and 
challenges the consistency of the EU asylum acquis.  
The paper concludes by putting forward some options to addressing SAR and disembarkation 
discussions and recommends that these should be based on the principle of equal solidarity, 
whereby all Schengen EU member states should share equally the responsibility for asylum 
seekers in full compliance with EU constitutive principles and fundamental rights. 
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Executive summary 
his paper examines recent political controversies and policy developments in search and 
rescue (SAR) and disembarkation in the Central Mediterranean. Disputes in this area 
among Mediterranean coastal states are by no means a novelty. They find their roots in 
long-standing disagreements over the interpretation and applicability of relevant international 
maritime law and human rights obligations and by the inability (or unwillingness) of EU member 
states to devise cooperative agreements among them to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of SAR operations. However, over the last few years, those disputes have been 
emphasised by the increasing politicisation of SAR and disembarkation issues at the EU and 
national levels and by the emergence of increasingly restrictive policy responses towards 
migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea.  
The politics of SAR criminalisation and disengagement 
This paper argues that EU and member state policy responses have been driven by a politics of 
SAR criminalisation and disengagement. The latter have materialised in a number of 
interrelated policy responses. First, the increasing policing and criminalisation of civil society 
actors and non-governmental organisations involved in SAR activities. Since 2017, actions taken 
to disrupt the activity of SAR NGOs have included the seizing and confiscation of NGO boats, 
the application of a ‘code of conduct’ limiting their independence, the launch of formal 
prosecutions based on unfounded allegations of facilitating irregular immigration and human 
smuggling, the refusal by the Italian government to allow access to national ports and, recently, 
the imposition of administrative fines against those organisations (Section 2.1 of the paper).  
Second, the strategic disengagement of national and EU actors from SAR activities in the Central 
Mediterranean. This approach has translated into the incremental ‘backing out’ and reduction 
of the operational space of Frontex Joint Maritime Operation Themis (launched in 2018), as 
well as the withdrawal of the naval means and SAR-related activities of EUNAVFOR-MED 
operation ‘Sophia’ (launched in 2015). Member state and EU disengagement from SAR 
activities has been accompanied by the progressive delegation of containment tasks to Libyan 
authorities, including in the form of ‘pullbacks’ to Libya of boats carrying migrants headed to 
Europe.  
Support by the EU and Italian government has materialised in the provision of funding, training, 
and equipment aimed at increasing the capacity of the Libyan Coast Guard to conduct unlawful 
interdiction operations at sea, enabling Libyan authorities to establish a Libyan Search and 
Rescue Region (SRR), and the setting up of a Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(MRCC). The European Commission has provided indirect financial support to these activities 
through the EU Trust Fund for Africa. The Commission has also controversially considered 
‘lawful’ the sharing, with the Libyan Coast Guard, of information on boat sightings by satellite 
maritime surveillance technologies such as EUROSUR Fusion Services in Frontex Themis Joint 
Operations and aerial assets of the EUNAVFOR-MED Sophia operation, (Section 2.2). 
T 
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While in 2018 the total number of irregular entries to Italy across the Central Mediterranean 
reached its lowest level since 2012, the perverse practical effects of these policies have been 
well documented and internationally criticised. The shrinking of SAR humanitarian and 
operational space has led to a surge in the number of deaths in the Mediterranean, with the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimating more than 15,000 deaths on the 
Central Mediterranean route alone from 2014 to 2018. Moreover, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that more than 45,000 people have been 
‘intercepted or rescued’ by the Libyan Coast Guard between 2016 and first half of 2019, and 
thereby exposed to grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity in a country 
that remains largely unsafe and in conflict (Section 2.1). 
‘Contained mobility’ and portable justice 
The range of policies aimed at restricting SAR operational capacities and criminalising the 
humanitarian actors involved in SAR operations may be understood as different components 
or ‘layers’ of a strategy of contained mobility that aims at limiting and filtering the movements 
of migrants and asylum seekers’ at different stages of their journeys. Contained mobility 
policies have been implemented through a matrix of legal, financial and operational 
instruments involving EU and member state actors, which have increasingly taken the form of 
‘extra-EU Treaty’ tools, such as emergency funds, memoranda of understanding and informal 
arrangements (Section 3). 
Policies adopted and/or implemented by European institutions, EU agencies and national 
authorities have been designed with the aim of escaping legal accountability and liabilities. 
However, despite the many still existing barriers to ensuring effective justice and remedies for 
the victims of those policies, this paper argues that those policies do not happen in a legal 
vacuum: they fall within the scope and have the potential of being taken on by international 
and EU justice venues, actors and instruments. In the case of EU member states, the portable 
justice approach to the applicability of EU law advocated in this paper implies that member 
state responsibility is not limited to cases where they exercise jurisdiction over individuals in 
line with the ECtHR case law, but also extends to all practices falling within the scope of EU law, 
including the provision of operational assistance by EU agencies and financial support through 
EU funding instruments (Section 3).  
The legality and legitimacy of EU and national policies in the field of SAR and disembarkation 
depend on their compatibility with legal standards stemming from international maritime law, 
international and regional human rights law and secondary EU legislation in the field of border 
surveillance and asylum 
First, international maritime law stipulates a clear duty for every shipmaster to render 
assistance in case of vessels or persons in distress at sea and considers the right to life as 
customary under international law. Coastal states have the obligation to establish effective SAR 
services ensuring the provision of assistance to any person in distress at sea. The state 
responsible for the search and rescue region where assistance has been rendered also has 
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primary responsibility for coordinating SAR activities in due diligence and ‘good faith’ with other 
states, as well as taking the lead in finding a port for disembarkation in a place of safety.  
States retain the right to allow or deny access to their national ports. International maritime 
law only imposes an ‘obligation of conduct’ to guarantee swift disembarkation in a place of 
safety of people in distress at sea. However, such an ‘obligation of conduct’ may become an 
obligation to disembark if no other option is available to ensure the safety of people on board 
or when the human rights and dignity of the people rescued would be jeopardised by 
unreasonably delayed disembarkation. While political controversies have continued regarding 
the exact scope of the concept of ‘place of safety’ in international maritime law, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and UNHCR have emphasised that states should 
avoid actions or inactions leading to disembarkation in unsafe territories and putting people at 
risk of torture, and/or inhuman or degrading treatment (Section 3.1 of this paper). 
Second, EU member states obligations under international maritime law must be read in light 
of their obligations under international and regional human rights and refugee law. A recent 
Joint Communication by no less than Five United Nations Special Procedures to the Italian 
Government issued in May 2019 concluded that the politics of SAR criminalisation and 
disengagement pursued by that government, including deterring migrants from arriving and 
facilitating ‘pullbacks’ by Libyan authorities, is leading to grave human rights violations of non-
derogable and absolute rights, such as the right to life and non-refoulement, which are in 
violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN 
Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (CAT). 
EU institutions, agencies and member states also incur responsibility when they directly or 
indirectly aid, assist, direct and control or coerce another state to engage in a conduct that 
violates international obligations, and which constitutes an internationally wrongful act in light 
of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). In cases where these acts constitute ‘crimes against 
humanity’, they fall within the framework of the Rome Statute and the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Recent requests have been made before the ICC and the ICC 
Prosecutor to open investigations into the complicity and collusion of high-ranking EU agents 
and Italian authorities in crimes against humanity in Libya, and into criminal liabilities for well-
documented crimes against migrants attempting to transit through the country and 
experiencing arbitrary detention, enslavement, torture, and other inhuman treatments in 
detention camps (Section 3.2). 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its landmark 2012 Hirsi case confirmed the 
extraterritorial reach of the human rights protection regime when assessing Italian authorities 
‘pushbacks’ to Libya of people intercepted at sea. The Strasbourg Court found that, by bringing 
intercepted migrants on board of Italian Navy vessels before escorting them to Libya, Italian 
authorities exercised exclusive de jure and de facto control over the persons concerned. The 
Hirsi doctrine represents a solid basis for tackling some of the more sophisticated containment 
policies currently deployed in the Mediterranean, including those involving the provision of 
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financial, technical and operational support to third country authorities in preventing migrant 
boats from reaching European shores (‘pullbacks’). Regarding the duty of states to allow 
disembarkation of migrants rescued at sea, however, the ECtHR has until now left unanswered 
the issue whether people rescued by NGO boats need to go through the suffering of waiting 
indefinitely at sea and eventually become ‘vulnerable’ for a government such as Italy to have 
an obligation to disembark. 
Third, SAR and disembarkation activities conducted by EU member states conducted in the 
framework of Frontex joint maritime surveillance operations are covered by EU Regulation 
656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
Frontex operational cooperation. The Regulation provides a common EU concept of ‘place of 
safety’ which is protection driven. It also requires the member state hosting the operation to 
accept disembarkation of rescued migrants in case there is no other possibility to identify a 
place of safety rapidly and effectively. Finally, maritime border surveillance by EU member 
states falls within the scope of the Schengen Border Code (SBC), which applies “without 
prejudice of(...)the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in 
particular as regards non-refoulement” (Art. 3.b SBC). 
Disembarkation platforms and controlled centres 
Over the last year, EU proposals to address disembarkation issues have centred on the possible 
establishment of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ in third countries and ‘controlled centres’ 
on the EU territory. However, almost one year from their formulation at the June 2018 
European Council, such proposals have failed to reach consensus due to their lack of political 
and legal feasibility. Controlled centres would mean that migrants disembarked in an EU 
member state would be transferred to these centres for an assessment of their international 
protection needs. Such ‘centres’ would essentially entail the continuation and further 
expansion of the hotspot approach deployed in Greece and Italy since 2015, albeit with a more 
formalised and systematic use of ‘administrative detention’. The hotspot model has not 
succeeded in preventing forced fingerprinting of individuals, quasi-detention practices, and 
keeping people in degrading and inhuman reception conditions.  
Similarly, regional disembarkation platforms have spurred a wide range of criticism and 
concerns – and have proved to be unfeasible in practice. As the possibility of disembarking 
individuals in distress at sea in the territory of a third country is conditional on their safety, i.e. 
including the principle of non-refoulement, the very idea has been considered unlawful and 
against EU Treaty values laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Another 
Joint Communication issued by UN Special Procedures (UN Rapporteurs and two Working 
Groups) to the European institutions on 18 September 2018 stated that “Outsourcing the 
responsibility of disembarkation to third countries, in particular those with weak protection 
systems, only increases the risk of refoulement and other human rights violations”. This idea 
has also been met with disagreement and criticism among African States, which are justifiably 
reluctant to accept EU policies that would imply setting up new detention facilities for 
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potentially disembarked people in their territories, as these would endanger their own 
international and regional commitments to ensure safety and the protection of human rights. 
Ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements 
Against the background of disagreements described above, since the summer of 2018, some 
cases of disembarkation following SAR operations conducted mainly by civil society vessels 
have been covered through new instruments called “temporary disembarkation and relocation 
arrangements”. They have involved a small group of member states willing to accept a share of 
asylum seekers disembarked in Spain, Italy and Malta and involved only a modest number of 
asylum seekers. While labelled as expressions of ‘pragmatism’ by some EU policy makers, their 
informal or ‘extra-EU Treaty’ nature raises serious concerns regarding their compliance with EU 
asylum standards, EU Treaty principles and fundamental rights. 
Since early 2019, the European Commission has been somewhat involved in the 
implementation of informal relocation arrangements following disembarkation in Italy and 
Malta (Section 4.2). The Commission has played the role of ‘facilitator’ or ‘deal broker’ among 
member states involved in the pledging exercise, and between those states and the Italian and 
Maltese governments. EU agencies, chiefly the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and 
Frontex, have also been mobilised to provide ‘support’ to member states’ authorities 
concerning disembarked persons, first reception, information provision, registration, and pre-
relocation selection procedures.  
The exact implementation of these arrangements has been described by the Commission as a 
“workflow” or “step-by-step work plan”. The Commission or EU agencies were only involved in 
specific stages and limited tasks of the relocation procedure, and were prevented from 
exercising any monitoring role regarding the overall compliance of adopted procedures with 
EU standards and the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. In spite of the involvement of the 
Commission and EU agencies, relocation arrangements have remained intergovernmentally 
driven and implemented under secretive and unaccountable patterns of cooperation. There 
continues to be no official publication of the number of migrants or asylum seekers involved, 
or any available piece of legislation laying down the precise administrative procedures and 
relocation distribution criteria being applied on the ground. The extent to which the 
involvement of Commission and EU agencies has helped in ensuring compliance with EU law, 
in particular by preventing discriminatory distribution of applicants and their fundamental 
rights between participating member states, is therefore by and large unclear (Section 4.2.1).  
The way forward: equal solidarity 
The implementation of ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements has not helped in 
moving forward with the much-needed reform of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) and the adoption of a permanent corrective relocation mechanism. The arrangements 
took place alongside a political choice by successive EU Presidencies of the Council to apply a 
logic of ‘consensus’ or de facto unanimity inside the Council rooms during the negotiations of 
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the CEAS reform package. This was the case in spite of the existence of a large group of member 
states – exceeding the threshold for a qualified majority – in favour of engaging in negotiations 
with the European Parliament on at least some of the legislative files. The choice to pursue 
unanimity in the Council has undermined the decision-making rules on asylum envisaged in the 
Treaties – which require Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), and has violated the principle of 
sincere cooperation among EU institutions.  
Based on the above, this paper argues that ‘differentiated integration’ in the form of 
‘temporary arrangements’ risks leading to unequal rather than lasting solidarity in the CEAS. 
Similarly, the use of variable geometry or the establishment of ‘coalitions of the willing’ in 
asylum policy do not further the objectives of the EU and do not reinforce the integration 
process. Despite their deficiencies and imperfections, EU asylum policies have, to a very large 
extent, been ‘Europeanised’ and brought under the Community framework. Proposals for 
flexible integration or ‘solidarité à la carte’ in these fields would be turning the clock backwards 
three decades and re-injecting nationalism and intergovernmentalism into fields that now are 
– despite their current deficiencies and limits – clearly under the remit of an EU competence 
(Section 4.2.2). This would also allow some member states to lower their own standards and 
indulge in ‘free riding’ on existing EU and international standards, opening the way for 
‘coalitions of the unwilling’ implementing diverging and competing areas of asylum within the 
Schengen area. 
The principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility enshrined in Article 80 of the Lisbon 
Treaty implies equality among all EU member states and a common EU response to the 
common challenges witnessed in the Mediterranean. The way forward should be guided by a 
paradigm of ‘equal solidarity’, whereby all EU member states share fairly and equally the 
responsibility for asylum seekers across the Union in full compliance with EU constitutive 
principles and fundamental rights. This would translate into the enactment of a set of policies 
(See Section 5 of the paper) that put EU and national constitutions principles first, as these 
constitute pre-conditions for legitimate EU policies in the areas of asylum, migration and 
borders based on mutual trust. 
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Search and rescue, disembarkation  
and relocation arrangements in the Mediterranean  
Sailing Away from Responsibility? 
Sergio Carrera and Roberto Cortinovis1 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 2019-10, June 2019 
Refugees attempting to escape Africa do not claim a right of admission to Europe.  
They demand only that Europe, the cradle of human rights idealism and the birthplace of the rule of law, cease 
closing its doors to people in despair who have fled from arbitrariness and brutality.  
That is a very modest plea, vindicated by the European Convention on Human Rights.  
We should not close our ears to it. 
 
Judge Pinto Albuquerque  
Concurring Opinion 
2012 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Judgment 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
1. Introduction  
Search and Rescue (SAR) and disembarkation of persons in distress at sea in the Mediterranean 
continue to fuel divisions among some EU member states. The ‘closed ports’ policy declared by 
the Italian ministry of interior in June 2018, and the ensuing refusal to let non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) ships conducting SAR operations enter Italian ports, triggered new 
diplomatic confrontations between the Italian government and other EU governments 
regarding which state should assume responsibility for accepting disembarkation of people 
rescued at sea.  
Disembarkation issues reignited in a context characterised by a widening SAR gap in the Central 
Mediterranean resulting from the penalisation of humanitarian actions and the strategic 
disengagement from SAR activities by the EU and its member states. Far from being a novelty, 
disputes over SAR and disembarkation are rooted in long-standing political controversies 
(Carrera and den Hertog, 2015; Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 2012; Basaran, 
2014). The latest debates at the EU level unfold against the background of disagreements 
among Mediterranean coastal governments over the interpretation and applicability of the 
international law of the sea (Papastavridis, 2017; Moreno-Lax and Papastavridis, 2017).  
Some of the proposals discussed during the second half of 2018, such as ‘regional 
disembarkation platforms’, which aim at shifting responsibilities for the disembarkation of 
rescued persons to North African countries, are both practically and legally unfeasible (Carrera 
                                                     
1 The authors would like to express their gratitude to representatives from the European Commission, the 
European Parliament (LIBE Secretariat), EU agencies (Frontex and EASO), UNHCR and civil society actors who were 
interviewed for the purposes of this paper. They would also like to thank Efthymios Papastavridis (Faculty of Law, 
University of Oxford), Michele Levoy and Marta Gionco (PICUM) and Kris Pollet (ECRE) for their comments on a 
previous draft of this paper. 
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et al., 2018). The European Commission also acknowledged that disembarkation platforms 
would be contrary to EU principles or ‘values’ laid down in the Treaties and member states’ 
constitutional and human rights traditions (European Commission, 2018a).  
From the summer of 2018 onwards, cases of disembarkation following SAR operations 
conducted by NGOs and other vessels in international waters have been addressed through so-
called “relocation and disembarkation arrangements”. These arrangements have consisted of 
voluntary, ad hoc and ‘ship-by-ship’ relocation schemes, involving a small group of member 
state governments ‘willing’ to accept a share of individuals disembarked in Spain, Malta and 
Italy. During the second half of 2018, these arrangements were conducted in a purely 
‘intergovernmental’ and ad hoc fashion, falling completely outside the EU framework.  
Since the beginning of 2019, disembarkation arrangements have counted with the involvement 
of the European Commission and EU agencies, including the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO) and Frontex. The Commission has played the role of ‘facilitator’ among interested 
member states making pledges for relocations, while EASO and Frontex have provided support 
in the phases of first reception, provision of information and registration of disembarked 
persons upon request of the governments of Italy and Malta (European Commission, 2019). In 
spite of the Commission’s attempt to increase ‘predictability and transparency’ of relocation 
arrangements, the predominantly informal, secretive and intergovernmental nature of these 
instruments has prevailed. A profound lack of public accountability has characterised the entire 
relocation procedure, including regarding the number of people disembarked and relocated, 
participating member states, and respect of the rights of asylum seekers ‘pushed around’ 
participating member states through informal relocations.  
This paper aims at critically examining recent developments on disembarkation and relocation 
arrangements in the Mediterranean. It argues that there is a wrong assumption behind current 
EU and national proposals and developments on SAR, disembarkation and their linkage with 
the allocation of responsibility for assessing asylum applications among EU member states. The 
prevailing idea seems to be that ‘contained mobility policies’ currently implemented in the 
Mediterranean are legitimate migration management strategies (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019); 
i.e. that policies and instruments aimed at disengaging from SAR operations, criminalising SAR 
civil society actors, financing, training and sharing information on sightings of boats with the 
Libyan Coast Guard for the sake of ‘pulling migrants back’ to Libya, delaying or refusing 
disembarkation of rescued people, and disregarding the rights of people disembarked during 
informal relocations escape the rule of law, and therefore accountability and legal responsibility 
for crimes and human rights violations. However, EU and member state containment-driven 
action and inaction in the Mediterranean do not happen in a legal vacuum.  
Neither national governments, nor the European institutions and agencies are free to ‘cherry 
pick’ from their rule of law and human rights responsibilities enshrined in national 
constitutions, EU Treaties and secondary law, which apply to all individuals, including those 
found in distress at sea and seeking international protection in the EU. The direct and indirect 
action and/or inaction of those actors are captured by the concept of portable justice, 
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according to which responsibilities and potential liabilities follow not only wherever they 
exercise de facto or de jure control and decisive influence, but also when their practices fall 
within the scope of EU law and financial instruments. 
The use of non-legally binding instruments such as disembarkation and relocation 
‘arrangements’ and the informalisation of relocations among a small group of EU member 
states bring profound risks to European integration. Unlike with the beginnings of European 
cooperation on asylum policies in the early 1990s, the current level of Europeanisation in these 
areas is – while imperfect –well advanced. ‘Flexible integration’ or ‘solidarity à la carte’ in the 
area of asylum may not further but actually reverse integration and undermine the objectives 
set out in the EU Treaties. It would allow some member states to free ride and lower down on 
existing EU asylum standards, and create ‘coalitions of the unwilling’ implementing diverging 
and competing areas of asylum within the Schengen area. These arrangements are deliberately 
‘extra-legal’ and therefore challenge key EU rule of law principles set in the Treaties and 
national constitutions. They pose profound risks to the consistency of the EU asylum and 
borders acquis and the right to seek asylum in the EU.  
After this Introduction, Section 2 of the paper briefly outlines the evolution of the SAR scenario 
in the Central Mediterranean over the last few years, underlining the emergence of what we 
call the politics of SAR criminalisation and disengagement in the Mediterranean. Section 3 
brings to light the main legal obligations and accountability venues of member states and EU 
actors regarding SAR and disembarkation stemming from international maritime law, 
international and regional human rights standards and secondary EU legislation in the field of 
border surveillance and asylum. Section 4 provides an analysis of the latest policy proposals 
that have been discussed and implemented in the EU context between the second half of 2018 
and first half of 2019. The conclusions highlight the need for the EU to come back to the notion 
of ‘equal solidarity’, whereby responsibility is upheld and equally shared among all Schengen 
countries, and firmly rooted in EU principles and fundamental rights laid down in the Treaties 
and member states’ constitutional traditions. 
2. The politics of SAR criminalisation and disengagement in the Central 
Mediterranean 
2.1 Policing SAR NGOs  
On Sunday 10 June 2018, the Aquarius ship, operated by Doctors without Borders (MSF) and 
the German NGO SOS Méditerranée, was heading North after having rescued 629 migrants in 
the course of six different SAR operations coordinated by the Italian Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre (MRCC) in international waters off the Libyan coast. The boat was halted 
on instruction from the Italian authorities when it was located at 35 nautical miles from Italy 
and 27 nautical miles from Malta (SOS Méditerranée, 2018). The Italian government refused 
the Aquarius access to Italy’s territorial waters, arguing that Malta should take responsibility 
for disembarking the migrants on board the vessel. The Maltese authorities denounced the 
Italian government’s stance as a manifest violation of international law and refused 
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authorisation to dock in the port of La Valletta. This disagreement led to a diplomatic standstill 
and a consequent operational impasse that impeded the swift disembarkation of rescued 
people in a place of safety. Eventually, the dispute over the fate of the Aquarius was broken by 
the decision of the Spanish government to allow disembarkation of the migrants on board in 
the port of Valencia.2  
The refusal to allow access to Italian ports for NGO vessels conducting SAR operations 
represents only the last and most extreme of a series of legal and political attacks against civil 
society ships involved in SAR activities in the Mediterranean (Carrera et al., 2019a). Over the 
last three years, humanitarian civil society actors have been subject to increasing policing and 
criminalisation dynamics, which have resulted in preventing them from pursuing SAR activities 
(Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019).3 Actions taken to disrupt NGO activities have included 
politically-driven criminal investigations for facilitating irregular entry, the confiscation of NGO 
vessels, the attempt to limit their activities by imposing ‘codes of conduct’ as well as recurrent 
de-legitimisation and criminalisation campaigns by some politicians and media outlets accusing, 
without evidence, NGOs of collusion with smugglers (Vosiliute and Conte, 2018; Cuttitta 2018; 
FRA, 2018a; Basaran, 2011).  
Since the Aquarius incident, a number of other cases of SAR operations conducted by NGOs 
have produced similar situations of delayed disembarkation and have forced rescued 
individuals to a prolonged period at sea in precarious and unsafe conditions (ECRE, 2019a), as 
well as additional cases of prosecutions of involved NGOs (FRA, 2019). In January 2019, the 
NGO vessel Sea Watch 3 carrying 47 people was permitted to dock at the port of Catania in 
Italy, after spending two weeks at sea, only when an agreement involving relocation in a group 
of member states could be agreed.4 Soon afterwards, the Italian authorities refused to allow 
disembarkation from the NGO ship Mare Jonio, belonging to the Italian citizen-financed 
initiative ‘Mediterranea – Saving Humans’, after it had saved 49 people in international waters.5 
                                                     
2 See Politico, ‘Spain will welcome migrant rescue ship turned away by Italy’, 6 November 2018, online: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-will-welcome-migrant-rescue-ship-turned-away-by-italy-pedro-sanchez-
matteo-salvini/; Reuters, ‘Boat caught in Europe's migration spat brings hundreds to Spain’, 17 June 2018, online: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy-spain/migrant-boat-turned-away-by-italy-arrives-in-
spain-idUSKBN1JD033  
3 Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, Letter to Prime Minister of Italy, Strasbourg, 31 January 
2019. The letter stated: “I am deeply concerned, however, about some recent measures hampering and 
criminalising the work of NGOs who play a crucial role in saving lives at sea, banning disembarkation in Italian 
ports, and relinquishing responsibility for search and rescue operations to authorities which appear unwilling or 
unable to protect rescued migrants from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.” 
4 See Reuters ‘Migrants disembark in Italy as Rome vows to continue hard line’, 31 January 2019, online: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy/migrants-disembark-in-italy-as-rome-vows-to-
continue-hard-line-idUSKCN1PP1Y7 
5 The Mare Jonio was allowed to disembark in the Italian port of Lampedusa the day after, on 19 March. The boat 
was seized immediately afterwards by order of the Italian Prosecutor in the context of an investigation into 
possible aiding and abetting of “illegal immigration”. See: Infomigrants, ‘Italy seizes migrant rescue boat Mare 
Jonio’, 20 March 2019, online: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/15804/italy-seizes-migrant-rescue-boat-
mare-jonio 
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In addition, over the last two years, reports have drawn attention to several episodes of 
aggression and acts of hostility by the Libyan Coast Guard authorities towards NGOs intervening 
in rescue operations within the Libyan SAR zone (Cuttitta, 2018). 
The escalation in the degree of penalisation of SAR civil society boats was taken to a new level 
by the Italian government with the adoption of Directive 14100/141(8) of March 2018.6 This 
directive requires Italian maritime and military authorities to prevent commercial and private 
boats that have carried out SAR in international waters from having access to Italian ports. Five 
United Nations Special Rapporteurs issued a joint communication on 15 May 2019 calling on 
the Italian government to withdraw the directive, and they put forward a number of serious 
concerns about the human rights violations resulting from its application. The joint 
communication acknowledged that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the directive 
was issued with the aim of directly targeting the SAR operations of the NGO boat Mare Jonio. 
The Special Rapporteurs highlighted that it “represents yet another political attempt to 
criminalise search and rescue operations carried out by civil society organisations in the 
Mediterranean…[and] intensifies the climate of hostility and xenophobia against migrants”.7 
The directive was subsequently followed by the adoption of a decree imposing financial 
penalties of up to €50,000 and seizure of the vessel for those NGOs that disregard the 
prohibition to enter Italian territorial waters.8 
As Table 1 below shows, the number of migrants rescued at sea along the Central 
Mediterranean to has substantially decreased over the last four years. However, the politics of 
criminalisation of NGOs and disengagement from SAR operations have contributed to making 
migrant journeys across the Mediterranean even more dangerous than in the past. According 
to UNHCR, an estimated 1,311 migrants lost their lives along the Central Mediterranean route 
connecting Libya to Italy during 2018. While the total number of deaths along this route more 
than halved in 2018 compared to 2017, the rate of deaths per number of people attempting 
the journey increased sharply. In particular, the rate went from one death for every 38 arrivals 
                                                     
6 Directive for the unified coordination of surveillance activities of maritime borders and fight against illegal 
immigration according to Article 11 of Legislative Decree n. 286/1998, alias Ministerial Circular n. 14100/141(8), 
issued in March 2019. 
7 United Nations Human Rights Special Procedures, Joint Communication, by the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights defenders; the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity; the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially 
women and children, 15 May 2019, ALITA 4/201 9. 
8 On the so-called “Decreto Sicurezza bis” see ‘Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 61, 11 Giugno 
2019’, online: http://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-61/12168; and 
EUobserver, ‘EU mute on new Italian decree to fine NGO boats’, 12 June 2019, online: 
https://euobserver.com/migration/145135  
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in 2017 to one for every 14 arrivals in 2018, and to one death for every 3 arrivals in the first 
four months of 2019 (UNHCR, 2019a, 2019b). 9 
The decrease in the number of entries cannot either hide the high number of people prevented 
from leaving Libyan territory, and exposed to grave human rights violations and crimes against 
humanity. Table 1 demonstrates how the total number of people “rescued or intercepted” by 
the Libyan Coast Guard authorities increased during 2017 and 2018 to more than 15,000 
people each year. According to UNHCR, during the second half of 2018, 85% of individuals 
rescued or intercepted10 in the newly established Libyan SAR region were disembarked in Libya, 
where they faced inhuman and degrading treatment in Libyan detention centres (UNHCR, 
2019a). 
Table 1. Number of Persons Rescued under the Coordination of Italian MRCC and Number of 
People Returned by Libyan Coast Guard 
 2016 2017 2018 201911 
Italian Coast Guard (Guardia Costiera) 35.875 22.014 3.987 40 
Italian Military (Marina Militare) 36.084 5.913 642  
Guardia di Finanza 1.693 1.184 1.842  
Carabinieri 174 79 215  
Foreign Military Vessels 7.404 1.495 42  
EUNAVFOR-MED Sophia Operation 22.885 10.669 2.310  
Commercial Vessels 13.888 11.355 1.438  
Civil Society and NGOs 46.796 46.601 5.204 97 
Frontex 13.616 14.976 4.046 35 
TOTAL 178.415 114.286 19.778 172 
People rescued/intercepted by Libyan 
Coast Guard12 14.332 15.358 15.235 1.994 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on statistics provided by Italian Coast Guard, Frontex and UNHCR  
                                                     
9 The numbers reported above should be read in the context of an overall decrease in arrivals through the Central 
Mediterranean route over the last three years: 181,436 in 2016, 119,369 in 2017, 23,370 in 2018 and 2,447 in the 
first six months of 2019. See UNHCR, Mediterranean situation, Italy, https://data2.unhcr.org/ 
en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205. According to IOM, from 2014 to 2018, an estimated 15,062 people 
died while crossing the Central Mediterranean route, making it the deadliest migration route in the world. See, 
IOM missing migrant project, online: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean?migrant_ 
route%5B%5D=1376&migrant_route%5B%5D=1377&migrant_route%5B%5D=1378 
10 Ryan has qualified “interdiction” as a form of extraterritorial immigration control. The interdiction of vessels at 
sea, differently from SAR, aims at “preventing sea-borne migrants from reaching their intended destination”. He 
qualifies the notion of ‘interception’ as “the identification of vessels, with a view to the arrest of vessels and their 
passengers once they entered territorial waters” (Ryan, 2010, pp. 22 and 23). 
11 The statistics under this column cover the first semester of 2019, with the exception of the Frontex statistics 
that correspond with the month of April 2019, based on the Frontex Press Pack, mid-May 2019. 
12 Refer to Italian Coast Guard website: https://www.guardiacostiera.gov.it/attivita/ricerca Data covering 2019 
extends until 14 June 2019. See UNHCR Libya Update, June 2019, retrievable from 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69930; UNHCR (2019), Libya: Activities at Disembarkation, 
monthly update February 2019 (available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68273); and 
UNHCR Libya: Activities at Disembarkation, monthly update December 2018 (available at 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67499). 
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2.2 Shrinking EU operational space and delegating containment 
Divisions between member states on disembarkation have also led to a downgrading of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation EUNAVFOR-MED Sophia, launched in 
2015 with the main goal to disrupting “criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean”. The overall rationale and effectiveness of the operation has 
been fundamentally questioned, including its negative contribution to the militarisation of 
maritime surveillance and the side effect of making trips more perilous as a result of its policy 
of destroying and confiscating boats (Carrera, 2018).13 While SAR was not formally included in 
the mandate of the mission, since its inception in 2015, the operation is reported to have 
rescued around 49,000 migrants.14 
At the end of 2018, the continuation of Operation Sophia became another source of contention 
between participating member states after a request by the Italian government to revise the 
mandate of the mission, and specifically the rule according to which all asylum seekers rescued 
in the framework of the mission should be disembarked in Italian ports.15 Due to the 
impossibility to reach an agreement on a new disembarkation arrangement, in March 2019, 
participating states decided to prolong the mission for a further six months but without 
deploying naval ships (to avoid involvement in SAR operations), focusing instead on air patrols 
and training of the Libyan Coast Guard (EEAS, 2019). 
EU member state politics of SAR disengagement have also included a tactical choice to reduce 
the new mandate and operational area of the Frontex Joint Operation Themis in the Central 
Mediterranean, which was launched in January 2018 to replace the previous Operation Triton 
(initiated in 2014).16 A key change in the scope of the Themis operation was reducing even 
further its operational area to the Italian SAR zone, and in contrast to the Triton operation, not 
covering the Maltese SAR area any longer. The Maltese government refused to take part in 
Themis Joint Operation in the absence of a clear rule foreseeing the disembarkation in Italian 
ports of people rescued in the Maltese SAR zone, which was the case under Triton’s operational 
plan based on a bilateral deal between Italy and Malta.17  
Another fundamental change in the mandate of the Frontex Themis operation in comparison 
with Triton is that disembarkation points are now identified on a ‘case-by-case’ basis by the 
                                                     
13 Politico, ‘Europe’s deadly migration strategy. Officials knew EU military operation made Mediterranean crossing 
more dangerous’, 28 February 2019, online: https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-deadly-migration-strategy-
leakeddocuments/ 
14 Euobserver, ‘Sophia in limbo: political games limit sea rescues’, 4 March 2019, https://euobserver.com/ 
opinion/144304 
15 Euractiv, ‘Italy to push EU for reform of ‘Operation Sophia’’, 30 August 2018, online: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/italy-to-push-eu-for-reform-of-operation-sophia/   
16 See News Release, Frontex launching new operation in Central Med, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-
centre/news-release/frontex-launching-new-operation-in-central-med-yKqSc7 
17 The Malta Independent, “Italian MEP asks Brussels about ‘secret Malta-Italy migrants for oil deal’”, 18 October 
2015, http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-10-18/local-news/Italian-MEP-asks-Brussels-about-secret-
Malta-Italy-migrants-for-oil-deal-6736143776. 
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Italian Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) on the basis of international law.18 
The limited involvement of the Frontex operation Themis in SAR activities is just the last step in 
disengagement from SAR activities in the Central Mediterranean that was initiated with the 
choice in 2014 to replace the Mare Nostrum operation with the much less ambitious (in terms 
of SAR capacity) Frontex-led Operation Triton (Carrera and den Hertog, 2015 ; Nielsen, 2014: 
Campbell, 2017). As Table 1 also shows, the overall result has been an increasingly and 
progressively minor involvement and contribution by Frontex of SAR operations in the Central 
Mediterranean.  
The stepping up of the Libyan Coast Guard in SAR operations constituted another important 
piece of the puzzle (UNHCR, 2019a). This development is directly related to the choice of the 
Italian government to progressively cede control to Libyan forces over SAR operations outside 
Libyan territorial waters. Italy had assumed de facto SAR responsibilities over this area since 
2013, when it began its humanitarian naval operation, Mare Nostrum. Libyan authorities 
submitted a declaration on a Libyan Search and Rescue Region (SRR) in December 2017, which 
was then officially validated by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in June 201819. 
The Libyan move was made possible by the operational and financial support provided to the 
Libyan authorities by the EU and Italian authorities. According to a leaked letter20 signed by the 
Director General of DG Home at the European Commission, Paraskevi Michou, and addressed 
to the Frontex Director, Fabrice Leggeri, on 18 March 2019, the Commission considered that it 
would be lawful for the operational plan of the Frontex Themis operation to include procedures 
for notifying sightings of boats in “distress” at sea to the Libyan Coast Guard, including data on 
vessel monitoring and detection through satellite technology that is part of the EUROSUR (The 
European Border Surveillance System) Fusion Services.21 The letter also revealed that the aerial 
                                                     
18 Interview with Frontex Official conducted by the authors. See also https://frontex.europa.eu/media-
centre/news-release/frontex-launching-new-operation-in-central-med-yKqSc7 
19 See Parliamentary questions. Answer given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the European Commission. 
Question reference: P-003665/2018, 4 September 2018. Retrievable from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
doceo/document/P-8-2018-003665-ASW_EN.html; Euronews, ‘Prompted by EU, Libya quietly claims right to order 
rescuers to return fleeing migrants’, 7 August 2018. Retrievable from: https://www.euronews.com/2018/ 
07/06/prompted-by-eu-libya-quietly-claims-right-to-order-rescuers-to-return-fleeing-migrants 
20 Retrievable from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-letter-from-frontex-director-ares-
2019)1362751%20Rev.pdf The letter states that “With regard to the statement on following procedures and 
notifying sightings of "distress" at sea to the "Responsible" MRCC (i.e. MRCC Libya) and also to neighbouring 
MRCCs (i.e. those of Italy and Malta) and EUNAVFOR MED Headquarters, I would like to note that Italy, despite 
the fact that it cannot be considered a "neighbouring MRCC" because it does not border the Libyan SRR, is 
supporting the Libyan Coast Guard a lot in particular in acting during the SAR event as a “communication relay”. 
In that regard, together with Malta, and following the standard practice, it would be appropriate to include Tunisia 
and Egypt as well.” 
21 EUROSUR purposes are “to detect, prevent and combat irregular immigration and cross-border crime”, and 
contribute to the protection and saving of lives of migrants at sea.  According to a leaked document on Operation 
Sophia, Libya is also connected to the ‘Service Oriented Infrastructure for Maritime Traffic Tracking (SMART)’ - an 
Internet-based secured communication network provided by the Italian Navy. The leaked document states that 
“SMART will work as the main communication and information exchange channel in the training of the Libyan 
Navy and Naval Coastguard (…) SMART is already being gradually augmented by EUROSUR, starting with FRONTEX 
METEO services, which will be made available to the Libyan Navy and Naval Coastguard through a technical 
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assets of the EUNAVFOR MED Sophia operation had shared similar information with the Libyan 
authorities.  
The position of the European Commission laid down in the above-mentioned letter stands in 
stark contradiction with the fact that several authoritative United Nations actors have clearly 
emphasised that Libya cannot be considered as a “safe port” and that “those rescued and 
intercepted at sea should not be returned there” (OHCHR and UNSMIL, 2018; IOM, 2019; 
UNHCR, 2019c). The letter also surprisingly disregards the incompatibility and unlawfulness 
inherent in EU agencies indirectly cooperating with Libyan authorities in sharing information 
on ‘sightings’ and therefore facilitating and being complicit with interceptions and ‘pullbacks’ 
leading to violations of the principle of non-refoulement and other severe human rights 
violations.  
3. International and EU legal standards: portable justice 
The range of policies aimed at restricting SAR capacities and criminalizing civil society actors 
involved in SAR activities need to be read as components or ‘layers’ of a broader strategy of 
contained-mobility whose aim is that of deterring, limiting and filtering asylum seekers’ 
movements at different stages of their various mobility trajectories. The contained mobility 
strategy combines measures aimed at preventing people from leaving third country territories 
and entering the Schengen area – e.g. border surveillance and interception at sea – along with 
limited mobility opportunities, in the forms of selective and discriminatory admission 
opportunities for refugees and applicants for international protection (Carrera and Cortinovis, 
2019). Figure 1 below starts by showing how in the context of the Central Mediterranean EU 
and member state containment strategies are made up of various ‘layers’, which can be 
summarised as follows:  
First, engaging third countries to conduct ‘migration management’ on their behalf as part of 
what has been called a ‘consensual or delegated containment’ approach (Moreno-Lax and 
Giuffré, 2017); this now includes delegating the enactment and implementation of interception 
measures (‘pullbacks’) to countries in North Africa, notably to Libya, taking the form of indirect 
EU financing, training and the sharing of information with third country authorities gathered 
through maritime satellite surveillance systems or aerial and vessel assets; second, strategically 
disengaging from SAR operations, including by reducing the operational areas of EU-
coordinated maritime operations (e.g. the Frontex Themis joint operation); third, policing and 
criminalising civil society actors conducting SAR operations and shrinking their operation space 
in the Mediterranean; fourth, refusing to allow disembarkation of migrants rescued at sea in 
                                                     
interface of SMART. EUROSUR could then be a complimentary system for information exchange, having an 
operational picture and situational awareness,” European External Action Service (EEAS), Sophia End of Month 6 
Report, 2016. See also Politico (2019), ‘Europe’s Deadly Migration Strategy: Officials Knew EU Military Operation 
made Mediterranean crossings more Dangerous’, 28.2.2019. See Regulation establishing the European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR) No 1052/2013, 22 October 2013, OJ L295/11. On EUROSUR and its place in the 
EU’s integrated border management, see Jeandesboz (2012); and on how EUROSUR affects fundamental rights, 
see FRA (2018b). 
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national ports; and fifth, applying substandard asylum procedures in the context of ‘hotspots’ 
and ad hoc relocation arrangements. 
Figure 1 also identifies the set of legal, political and financial instruments used to implement 
the various contained mobility layers, which are of financial, political, legal or operational 
nature, and which have increasingly been designed as extra-EU Treaties. The two last fields of 
the figure lay down the main international, regional and EU legal instruments, as well as a 
selection of monitoring, judicial and administrative actors acting as ‘justice venues’ with a 
mandate to scrutinise, enforce or adjudicate on individuals’ cases and complaints.22 The arrow 
at the bottom of the figure aims at illustrating how, while unlawful practices and human rights 
violations and crimes emerging from contained mobility layers and instruments still experience 
substantial barriers for ensuring effective remedies to victims, they can nonetheless be 
potentially captured by the concepts of portable responsibility and justice.  
The concept of ‘portable responsibility’ is premised on the existence of a ‘functional approach’ 
to the applicability of EU fundamental rights in cases of extraterritorial policies and practices. 
This implies that the EU CFR applies whenever a situation falls under the remit of EU law, with 
territoriality not being a decisive criterion (Moreno-Lax and Costello, 2014; Carrera and Stefan, 
2018; Carrera et al. 2018).  
This was confirmed by a 2009 Letter of the European Commission referred to in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy of February 2012 (see 
Section 3.2 below). When examining the application of EU law at times of assessing the legality 
of interceptions of migrants in international waters and ‘pushbacks’ to Libya by Italian 
authorities, the Commission concluded that “border surveillance activities conducted at sea, 
whether in territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone or on the high 
seas, fall within the scope of application of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC)”, and the EU 
notion of “border surveillance” laid down in Article 12 of the SBC.23 
The concept of portable responsibility in the context of EU law entails that, whenever member 
states or EU authorities cooperate with third-country authorities – directly or indirectly through 
the provision of ‘support’, in the form of funding, training, equipment and any other kind of 
assistance – their responsibilities need to be assessed against the EU’s fundamental rights and 
legal standards. This requires compliance with the right to asylum (Art.18) and to an effective 
remedy (Art. 47) under the EUCFR (Carrera et al. 2018). If an EU Member State or an EU 
institution or agency provide direct or indirect financial and/or technical “assistance” to a third 
country that result in fundamental rights violations, they could be considered liable in light of 
their obligations under the EU CFR before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU).  
                                                     
22 For an overview of existing international dispute settlement mechanisms and justice venues dealing exclusively with 
the law of the sea refer to D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens (2016), pp. 473-505, and Y. Tanaka (2015), pp. 417-452.     
23 Paragraph 34 of the Hirsi judgment, referring to a letter of 15 July 2009 from Mr Jacques Barrot, Vice-President 
of the European Commission. The letter also stated that while EU law does not apply in international waters, the 
acquis, “including the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive, applies … to asylum applications made on …the borders, 
transit areas and, in the context of maritime borders, territorial waters of Member States”. 
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Figure 1. Contained mobility and portable justice 
 
Source: Authors, 2019. 
The multi-layered containment approach enacted by the EU and some EU member state 
governments in the Mediterranean seems to be based on the assumption that relevant EU 
member states can in fact be ‘exonerated’ of their legal responsibilities and escape 
accountability under international, regional and EU standards and venues. However, such an 
assumption is misleading. Contained mobility instruments at sea fall within the scope of 
international and regional standards laid down in international maritime law (see Section 3.1. 
below) and human rights law (see Section 3.2), and pose profound challenges to their faithful 
implementation. They also stand at odds with the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation 
found at the basis of EU law, including EU rules on maritime and border surveillance law (see 
Section 3.3.) (Moreno-Lax and Papastavridis, 2016; Carrera et al., 2018).  
3.1 International maritime law  
The most relevant international treaties covering SAR at sea include, first, the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). Art. 98 of this Convention lays down a duty 
to every state to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger and to proceed with 
all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress. The obligation to secure the right to life 
constitutes international customary law. The UNCLOS Convention foresees the need for coastal 
states to establish, operate and maintain adequate and effective SAR services, which may 
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include cooperation with neighbouring states and the conclusion of mutual regional 
arrangements (Art. 98.2).24 Similar requirements are included in the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safeguard of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), specifically the obligation for 
shipmasters to provide “with all speed” assistance at sea.25 The SOLAS Convention also states 
the need for states to ensure that “any necessary arrangements are made for coast watching 
and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea round its coasts” and to communicate and 
coordinate SAR activities, including through the establishment of SAR facilities. 
A set of more detailed provisions are included in the 1979 International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue (the so-called SAR Convention), which stipulates a common 
definition of ‘rescue’ entailing “an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their 
initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety” (emphasis added).26 The 
SAR Convention underlines the need for states to set up a Search and Rescue Region (SRR) and 
a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) responsible for “promoting efficient 
organisation of search and rescue services and for coordinating the conduct of search and 
rescue operations” within their respective SAR region. 
Important amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions were introduced in 2004 to 
strengthen the search and rescue system and minimise the risk that commercial ships refrain 
from providing rescue to boats in distress (Barnes, 2010). The amended Paragraph 3.1.9 of the 
SAR Convention specifies that the state responsible for the SAR region where assistance has 
been rendered is primarily responsible for “ensuring such co-ordination and cooperation 
occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a 
place of safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and guidelines 
developed by the Organization” (emphasis added). The MRCC of the relevant SAR state is also 
required to initiate the process of identifying the most appropriate place of disembarkation of 
persons in distress at sea. 27 Moreover, the same paragraph 3.1.9 requires states to cooperate 
to ensure that shipmasters providing assistance to persons in distress at sea are released from 
their obligations with minimum further deviation from their intended voyage, as long as this 
does not endanger their safety. This applies both to commercial ships and those of NGOs, and 
aims at incentivising the former to intervene in cases of boats in distress at sea. 
                                                     
24 The UNCLOS framework foresees a dispute settlement procedure, some of which are considered compulsory 
and which states parties may declare preference for in light of Article 287 Section 2 of the Convention. These may 
include the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal 
established under Annex VII of the Convention or a special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII. For the purposes of 
this paper it is important to highlight that Italy has declared as preferred venues for dispute resolution the ITLOS 
and the International Court of Justice. Refer to D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens (2016). 
25 Regulation 10 Ch. 5 of SOLAS. 
26 The SAR Convention (para. 1.3.13) defines a “distress phase” as a “situation wherein there is a reasonable 
certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate 
assistance”. 
27 See IMO (Maritime Safety Committee), amendments to both the International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (adopted May 2004, 
entered into force 1 July 2006). Resolutions MSC.155 (78) and MSC.153 (78), 20 May 2004. 
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The interpretation of the 2004 amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions based on the 
principle of effectiveness would lend support to a default obligation of disembarkation on the 
SAR responsible state. However, divergent practices and interpretations of states underline 
how this is still a matter of contention (Papastavridis, 2018). The situation in the Mediterranean 
epitomises such contrasts: Malta has not accepted disembarkation of asylum seekers and third 
country nationals rescued in its SAR zone, arguing that this should happen in the ‘nearest safe 
haven’, namely the port closest to the location of the rescue which may be deemed as a place 
of safety (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2016). Controversies between Italy and Malta over 
disembarkation have been fuelled by the specific configuration of their respective SAR areas in 
the Mediterranean basin, and specifically by the enormous extension of the Maltese SAR zone 
and by the overlapping of Italian and Maltese SAR regions (Trevisanut, 2010; Di Filippo, 2013). 
International maritime law recognizes the right of coastal states to take “necessary steps” in 
their territorial sea to prevent foreign vessels’ passage which is not innocent, that is prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. However, states’ right to take action 
to guarantee order and security within their borders must not be used as a way to evade 
obligations to ensure safety and protect the right of people rescued at sea.28 Papastavridis has 
argued that a key shortcoming of the international maritime Treaty system is that “it does not 
formally obligate the coastal State responsible for the Search and Rescue Area to disembark 
rescued persons on its own territory, but only impose rather an obligation of conduct” 
(Papastavridis, 2018; Papastavridis, 2017). However, such an ‘obligation of conduct’ may in fact 
become an obligation to disembark if no other option ensuring the safety of the rescued people 
and the swift conclusion of the disembarkation operation exists.  
Indeed, international maritime law requires delivery of rescued persons as soon as possible to 
a ‘place of safety’ that is nevertheless not defined either in the SOLAS or in the SAR Convention. 
To address this gap, in 2004 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued ‘Guidelines 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued At Sea’ which state the need, in the case of persons 
seeking international protection “to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and 
freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened”. UNHCR 
has underlined that the place of safety concept must correspond with a place where rescued 
persons are not at any risk of persecution and where asylum seekers have access to fair and 
efficient asylum procedures and reception conditions (UNHCR, 2002). As is further developed 
in Section 3.3 below, EU maritime surveillance rules provide for a clearer EU concept of ‘place 
of safety’ that is international protection and fundamental rights driven.  
3.2 International, regional and EU human rights 
The international legal regime governing SAR at sea and international and EU human rights 
instruments are interlinked and must be read in conjunction. The faithful application of 
international, regional and EU human rights standards substantially restricts the scope for non-
disembarkation (and denying entry) strategies adopted by some Mediterranean states, as these 
                                                     
28 See Art. 19 and 25 of the UNCLOS.  
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fall within the scope of human rights jurisdiction. While a ‘migration management approach’ is 
driving current SAR and disembarkation activities in the Mediterranean, governments cannot 
evade or strategically avoid their previously-contracted international obligations towards 
migrants, asylum seekers and refugees even in the context of extraterritorial migration 
management operations (Moreno-Lax and Giuffré, 2017).  
The relevant provisions concerning SAR and disembarkation outlined in the previous section 
should be read in light of relevant human rights standards, including for instance those covering 
the right to respect and protect life, the respect of the non-refoulement principle and the 
prohibition to expose people to death, torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, and the 
right to life. All these are enshrined not only in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, but also in 
other key international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment (CAT), as well as regional human rights frameworks, notably the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Moreover, attacks on SAR civil society actors 
and their criminalisation are incompatible with the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. 
Within the international human rights framework, the principle of non-refoulement comprises 
the obligation not to extradite, deport or otherwise transfer (directly or indirectly) a person to 
a third country, thus not exposing her/him to a personal, foreseeable risk of being subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The above-mentioned 
joint communication by UN Special Procedures to the Italian government on 15 May 2019 
states that “practices whereby countries of destination cooperate with another to prevent 
migrants and refugees from arriving have been characterized as ‘pullbacks’ and as violations of 
the principle of non-refoulement, which constitutes an integral part of the absolute and non-
derogable prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment enshrined in Article 3 CAT and Articles 
6 and 7 of ICCPR”. The communication also encouraged Italian judicial authorities to take into 
account its findings. 
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) has emphasised that “state responsibility may 
exceptionally arise when a state aids, assists, directs and controls or coerces another state to 
engage in a conduct that violates international obligations” (FRA, 2016). This corresponds with 
Articles 16, 17 and 18 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which regulate state responsibilities when 
aiding or assisting other states in the commission of an “internationally wrongful act”, including 
grave human rights violations.29 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made use of 
                                                     
29 Article 16 ASR states: “A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of 
the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if 
committed by that State.” As Frenzen has argued in this regard, “the practical problem presented when seeking 
to analyse or challenge EU member state assistive practices is establishing the nature of the specific migration 
control practice”. See Frenzen N. W. (2017), “The Legality of Frontex Operation Hera-Type Migration Control 
Practices in Light of the Hirsi Judgement”, in T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and J. Vedsted-Hansen (eds), Human Rights 
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the ARSIWA when ascertaining whether states’ responsibility is engaged because of either their 
duty to refrain from wrongful conduct or their positive obligations under the convention.30 
When any states engages, directly or indirectly, in internationally wrongful acts and grave 
human rights violations, their practices fall within the framework of the Rome Statute and the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).31 A joint letter issued in March 2018 by a 
group of academics expressed deep concerns about the ongoing Italian ministry of interior 
policy against civil society actors engaged in SAR activities.32 The letter underlined that under 
international law, shipmasters are under a clear obligation to assist people in distress at sea, 
and to bring them to a place of safety. By requiring vessels’ captains to hand over rescued 
people to the Libyan Coast Guard and by seizing SAR NGO boats the Italian government has 
exposed rescued people to grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity. The 
same letter called the UN Security Council to consider Italy’s actions as a threat to international 
peace and security and to promote a coordinated approach to SAR in the Mediterranean. It 
also asked the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to initiate proprio motu an 
investigation into high-ranking Italian authorities as regards their complicity in the crimes 
against humanity taking place in Libya; and it asked Council of Europe members to file an inter-
state complaint against the Italian government before the European Court of Human Rights.  
The ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation in Libya back in 2011 over crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.33 As reported by the ICC Prosecutor before the United 
Nations Security Council in 2017 and 2018,34 the investigation also covers crimes against 
migrants transiting through Libya, including those in official and unofficial detention centres. 
Mann, Moreno-Lax and Shatz (2018) have correctly argued that not investigating collusion by 
                                                     
and the Dark Side of Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control, Abingdon and New 
York, NY: Routledge (2017), pp. 294-313. 
30 See ‘Study of the CEDH case-law Article 1 and 5’, Report prepared by the Research and Library division, 
Directorate of the Jurisconsult, European Court of Human Rights.  https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Research_report_articles_1_5_ENG.pdf 
31 See “Elements of Crimes”, International Criminal Court, in particular explanations on Art. 7 (Crimes against 
Humanity), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOf 
CrimesEng.pdf In particular explanations on Art. 7 (Crimes against Humanity). 
32 See Statement by 29 academics on Italy seizing the rescue boat Open Arms, retrievable from 
http://statewatch.org/news/2018/mar/open-arms-statement.pdf 
33 See ICC Prosecutor (2011), Situation in Libya: ICC-01/11, March 2011. https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya 
34 See ICC Prosecutor Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970 (2011), 8 November 2018; Available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_lib_unsc 
Paragraph 41 of her speech stated that “I come back to the issue of crimes against migrants as it is a serious matter 
that continues to preoccupy me and my Office.  I have instructed my Office to continue its inquiries into the alleged 
crimes against migrants transiting through Libya. Depending on the precise facts and circumstances that might be 
established in the course of a full investigation, such crimes may fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.  This issue 
must be decided through a case by case analysis based on the relevant facts and an assessment of my Office's 
jurisdiction.  Such work will be strictly within our mandate as set by the Rome Statute.”; See ICC Prosecutor 
Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), 2 
November 2018, paragraphs 16 and 18 of her speech also https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name 
=20181102-otp-stat 
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European actors and “investigating exclusively crimes by human traffickers […] reflects an 
unacceptable bias, and would likely amount to selective prosecution”. This corresponds with 
the position expressed in a report of February 2018 by the UN Special Rapporteur on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which calls on states and the 
ICC Prosecutor to investigate crimes resulting from “direct or indirect consequence of 
deliberate State policies and practices of deterrence, criminalization, arrival prevention, and 
refoulement.”35 
A recent Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) titled “EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya” points out that in 
the name of the so-called “European humanitarian refugee crisis” in 2015, the EU and its 
member states consciously enacted a “deterrence-based policy of premeditated and 
intentional practice of non-assistance to migrants in distress at sea”, which has determined “a 
lethal gap in the relevant SAR zone, in an area under the effective control of the EU and its 
member states’ actors.”36 Particular attention is paid to the deathly effects of the strategy to 
reduce and limit the operational area of intervention of subsequent Frontex joint maritime 
operations such as Triton.37 It states that “The strategy followed by the EU consisted of the 
externalization of maritime and human rights obligations that comes with its effective control 
over the said zones to non-state actors, para-state actors and foreign partners, in a (failed) 
attempt to avoid exposure to these legal responsibilities”,38 and adds that “the only remaining 
question to resolve relates to the identity of the most responsible perpetrators, which requires 
intense investigations in the European apparatus and State members bureaucracies.”39 
                                                     
35 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
A/HRC/37/50, 26 February 2018. See Recommendation 65.j of the Report. Retrievable at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Torture/A_HRC_37_50_EN.pdf 
36 Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute. EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014-2019), paragraph 32  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-icc-case-EU-Migration-Policies.pdf  
37 It expressly states that “[…] In contrast with Operation Mare Nostrum, Triton was not primarily tasked with 
Search and Rescue (SAR) operations but with “deterrence objectives”, was provided with far fewer means and 
resources, and its operational scope did not cover the critical SAR area where most migrant boats are likely to be 
in distress. The consequence of this decision was the creation of a lethal SAR gap, in an area in the Mediterranean 
that is under the effective control of the European Union, in which thousands would drown… Building on the lethal 
act of deterrence, namely punishing one to discourage others, this policy was unlawful per se... EU officials and 
agents were not only aware. This was both their intention, and the direct consequence of their decision to move 
from Mare Nostrum to Triton, namely to assign a drastically smaller budget and fewer vessels for SAR, to locate 
them farther away so they would not be assigned command over the rescue … [this] meant the sacrifice of life of 
thousands of helpless persons in distress at sea”. paragraphs 520-523 and paragraphs 555, 561 and 562 of the 
communication. 
38 Paragraph 480 adds that “The manner in which these crimes have been committed is the result of 
a systematization of impunity set up through a complex structure of power with diverse types of State and non-
State actors, and a combination of co-perpetrators at different levels operating both within and outside an area 
of armed conflict. This apparatus allowed the executors to act without fear of retaliation, and the planners to be 
certain that they would never face any kind of accountability”.  
39 Ibid., paragraph 503. 
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Member states’ human rights responsibilities under the Council of Europe (CoE) and the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) require a protection-driven approach. CoE states 
parties involved in SAR operations have to take all necessary measures to protect the lives of 
individuals in situations of distress who are within their jurisdiction and influence. This principle 
was recently reiterated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in an interim measure 
of 29 January 2019 concerning the case of the NGO vessel Sea Watch 3 (see Section 4.2.1 below 
on disembarkation and relocation arrangements since the beginning of 2019). The boat carried 
47 rescued migrants on board, who were not allowed by the Italian authorities to go ashore. 
While the Court did not grant the applicants’ requests to be disembarked as requested by the 
Captain of the ship, it requested the Italian government “to take all necessary measures, as 
soon as possible, to provide all the applicants with adequate medical care, food, water and 
basic supplies as necessary”.40 This has been confirmed by a more recent ECtHR interim 
measure also at the request of Sea Watch 3, where the Court insistent on the obligation by the 
Italian authorities “to continue to provide all necessary assistance to those persons on board 
Sea-Watch 3 who are in a vulnerable situation on account of their age or state of health”.41 This 
Interim Measure leaves however unanswered the extent to which people rescued by NGO 
boats need to go through the painful suffering of waiting indefinitely at sea and eventually 
become ‘vulnerable’ for a government such as Italy to be imposed an obligation to disembark. 
The ECtHR case law has found that jurisdiction may be present in cases of both de jure as well 
as de facto (indirect) control by state actors, both territorially and extraterritorially. The 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR was recognised by the ECtHR in the Hirsi Jamaa and 
Others v. Italy of February 2012 (Giuffre, 2016). The Strasbourg Court ruled that – in the context 
of the “pushback operations” to Libya conducted by the Italian Navy forces – Italy had assumed 
both continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control over the affected applicants by 
bringing them on board Italian navy vessels and returning them to Libya.42 In a Concurrent 
Opinion to this judgment, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque highlighted that “excision” of a part of 
the territory of a state from the migration zone in order to avoid the application of general legal 
guarantees to people arriving at that part of “excised” territory represents a blatant 
circumvention of a state’s obligations under international law”.43 
The ECtHR confirmed its Hirsi doctrine of de jure and de facto control in respect of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain,44 which concerned border-control 
practices, chiefly the so-called ‘hot returns’ or automatic expulsion or pushbacks by Spanish 
                                                     
40 See “ECHR grants an interim measure in case concerning the Sea Watch 3 vessel”. European Court of Human 
Rights, Newsletter - February 2019. 
41 See “The Court decides not to indicate an interim measure requiring that the applicants be authorised to 
disembark in Italy from the ship Sea-Watch 3”, European Court of Human Rights Press Release, 25.6.2019. 
42 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, para. 81. 
43 Judge Pinto Albuquerque, Concurring Opinion,2012 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Judgment, European Court 
of Human Rights, page 76 of the judgement. Reference was here made to Ryan (2010). 
44 N.D. and N.T. v Spain, Application nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, ECtHR (3 October 2017), para. 54. On 29 January 
2018, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber and final judgement is still pending. 
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authorities from Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco. Furthermore, the Strasbourg Court has also 
determined responsibility for human rights violations in situations where the threshold of full 
and exclusive control over a ship set by the Hirsi case was not met. In the 2009 case Women on 
Waves v. Portugal,45 in particular, the Court assumed that the combination of a government 
notification to the captain of an NGO boat prohibiting to enter Portuguese waters and the 
presence of a war ship blocking its entry constituted strong enough indicators for unlocking the 
application of the ECHR (Fink and Gombeer, 2018). 
The ECtHR jurisprudence described above represents a basis for addressing some of the more 
sophisticated containment policies currently deployed in the Mediterranean, including those 
involving the provision of financial, technical and operational support to third countries 
authorities for preventing asylum seekers and migrants’ movements (Baumgärtel, 2018; 
Pijnenburg, 2018; Global Action Network, 2018).  
In May 2018, a coalition of NGOs and scholars filed an application against Italy with the ECtHR 
concerning an incident on 6 November 2017 in which the Libyan Coast Guard interfered with 
the efforts of the NGO vessel Sea-Watch 3 to rescue 130 migrants from a sinking dinghy in 
international waters. According to the applicants, more than 20 persons drowned before and 
during the operation, while 47 others were ‘pulled back’ to Libya, where they endured 
detention in inhumane conditions, beatings, extortion, starvation, and rape (Global Legal Action 
Network, 2018). 46 
The applicants claim that the intervention of the Libyan coast guard was partly coordinated by 
the MRCC in Rome, while an Italian navy ship, part of the Italian Mare Sicuro operation, was 
also closed to the area of intervention. In addition, the episode should be read in the context 
of the terms of the 2017 Italy-Libya Memorandum of understanding, as well as financial support 
provided to the Libyan Coastguard by the EU, including through the EU Trust Fund for Africa. 
These circumstances, they argue, establishes Italy’s legal responsibility under the ECHR for the 
actions of Italian and Libyan vessels in the case under consideration. 47 
                                                     
45 Women on Waves v. Portugal, Application No. 31276/05, ECtHR, 3 February 2009. The applicants in this case 
were three NGOs that used a ship providing information on abortion and reproductive rights to women and which 
when attempting to enter Portugal to hold information meetings with interested women were refused entry by 
the Portuguese authorities in a way that the ECtHR found to be a disproportionate interference with the human 
right of freedom of expression.  
46 The application made use of evidence compiled by Forensic Oceanography, part of the Forensic Architecture 
agency based at Goldsmiths, University of London, which has produced a detailed reconstruction using video 
footage of the sequence of the events. See: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/seawatch-vs-the-
libyan-coastguard. 
47 For an overview of events providing evidence of direct and indirect involvement of EU and member states’ 
authorities in interception, detention and pullback operations conducted by the Libyan Coast Guard, see 
Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to the Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute. EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014-2019) 1.3.3 and 1.3.4.  
SEARCH AND RESCUE, DISEMBARKATION AND RELOCATION ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN | 19 
 
3.3 EU maritime and border surveillance standards 
SAR and disembarkation activities of EU member states are currently not covered by a common 
EU legal framework, except for those activities carried out in the context of Frontex-led joint 
operations at sea (Carrera and den Hertog, 2015), which are covered by Regulation 656/201448 
and the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).49 Regulation 656/2014 applies to all Frontex-
coordinated maritime border surveillance operations and includes a set of SAR and 
disembarkation obligations for ‘participating units’ (i.e. the law-enforcement vessels of 
member states). The main merit of Regulation 656/2014 is that of providing interpretative 
clarity on some SAR and disembarkation issues under the international maritime law 
framework by including more detailed and precise rules. It also foresees EU definitions of 
autonomous nature and shared standards that can be seen as ‘benchmarks’ against which 
current malpractices by some EU member states in the Mediterranean can be assessed.  
In the case of disembarkation following a SAR operation, the regulation establishes that the 
member state hosting the operation and participating member states shall cooperate with the 
responsible Rescue Coordinating Centre (RCC) to identify a place of safety and ensure that 
disembarkation of rescued persons is carried out rapidly and effectively. In case it is not possible 
to ensure that, the participating unit shall be authorised to disembark the rescued persons in 
the member state hosting the operation (Art. 10.1). Art. 2.12 provides a clear and protection-
driven definition of ‘place of safety’, which could be considered as an autonomous EU legal 
concept. According to this provision the notion of ‘place of safety’ means a “location where 
rescue operations are considered to terminate and where the survivors’ safety of life is not 
threatened, where their basic needs can be met and from which transportation arrangements 
can be made […] taking into account the protection of their fundamental rights in compliance 
with the principle of non-refoulement”.  
Article 4 of the regulation includes provisions on protection of fundamental rights and non-
refoulement, which apply to all cases of disembarkation in the context of sea operations 
conducted by the Frontex agency (Peers, 2014). In line with the Hirsi Case of the ECtHR 
discussed above, the regulation lays down a set of procedural steps to be followed when 
considering disembarkation of rescued migrants in a third country. Article 4 requires, in the 
context of planning a sea operation, that the host member state, in coordination with 
participating member states and the Frontex agency, takes into consideration the general 
situation in the third country concerned, based on information derived from a broad range of 
sources, including evidence provided by international organisations, EU bodies and agencies, 
before disembarking rescued persons in a third country.  
                                                     
48 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 15 May 2014, OJ L 189. 
49 Regulation on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code) 2016/339, 9 March 2016, OJ L 77/1. 
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The regulation also foresees in Art. 4.3 a central EU benchmark: before any rescued person is 
disembarked in, forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to the authorities of 
a third country, the Frontex operation must conduct a case-by-case assessment of their 
personal circumstances and provide information on the destination. The rescued persons will 
also need to be offered the possibility “to express any reasons for believing that disembarkation 
in the proposed place would be in violation of the principle of non-refoulement”. In practice, 
Art. 4.3 makes it mandatory that the rescued persons are in fact disembarked in EU member 
states for such an individual assessment to be carried out properly. This corresponds with the 
protections provided in the SBC concerning ‘border surveillance’ activities, which apply 
“without prejudice of ... the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, 
in particular as regards non-refoulement” (Art. 3.b SBC). The Maritime Surveillance Regulation 
provides a template to be used in future EU-coordinated SAR operations, and to assess the 
legality of the indirect support and cooperation between the EU, Frontex, the Italian 
government and the Libyan Coast Guard authorities.  
4. Taking stock of policy proposals on SAR and disembarkation in the 
Mediterranean 
4.1 Controlled Centres and Regional Disembarkation Platforms 
Basaran (2014) has argued that in recent years “an increasing number of laws, regulations and 
practices on national, regional and international levels have effectively discouraged rescue at 
sea and encouraged seafarers to look away, leading to the incremental institutionalization of a 
norm of indifference to the lives of migrants”. EU policy discussions continued this worrying 
course of action during the second half of 2018 under the Austrian Presidency of the EU.  
The European Council held in June 2018 under the Austrian Presidency paved the ground by 
calling for ‘a new approach based on shared or complementary actions among member states 
to the disembarkation of those who are saved in SAR operations. To identify concrete proposals 
in this area, EU heads of state called on the Council and the Commission to swiftly explore the 
controversial concept of “regional disembarkation platforms”, in close cooperation with 
relevant third countries as well as UNHCR and IOM. On the same occasion, the European 
Council agreed to explore the possibility for those disembarked on the EU territory to be 
transferred to so-called “controlled centres” in EU member states (European Council, 2018).  
The concepts of ‘disembarkation platforms’ and ‘controlled centres’ were further elaborated 
by the European Commission in two informal ‘non-papers’ released in June and July 2018 
(European Commission 2018a, 2018b). Discussions regarding the operationalisation of the two 
concepts have also been conducted within an EU Council Working Group (Council of the EU, 
2018). However, ‘disembarkation platforms’ or ‘arrangements’ (as they were subsequently 
defined by the Commission) as well as ‘controlled centres’ have remained insufficiently 
developed and characterised by a worrisome lack of legal certainty (European Parliament, 
2018a). 
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‘Controlled centres’ would mean that migrants disembarked in an EU member state would be 
transferred to these centres for an assessment of their international protection needs. They 
would essentially entail the continuation and further expansion of the hotspot approach 
deployed in Greece and Italy since 2015, albeit with a more formalised and systematic de facto 
use of ‘administrative detention’. In its elaboration of the concept, the Commission specified 
that migrants and asylum seekers disembarked in those centres would be registered and 
processed in an “orderly and effective way”, with full EU support, including for the sake of 
voluntary relocation. The Commission recommended an expanded use of accelerated and 
border procedures, followed by a quick return procedure in case of negative decisions 
(European Commission, 2018a, 2018c). 
The establishment of ‘controlled centres’ has raised serious concerns regarding their potential 
negative impact on protection standards in the EU, which would rather make of them 
‘uncontrolled centres’ from a human rights perspective. A joint communication issued by UN 
Special Procedures (five UN Rapporteurs and two Working Groups) to the European institutions 
on 18 September 201850 emphasised the difficulties that such centres would face in ensuring 
due process guarantees and legal safeguards, “including proper individual assessments and 
safeguards against arbitrary detention”.  
An expansion of the hotspots model is indeed problematic, in light of the wealth of evidence of 
forced fingerprinting of individuals, quasi-detention practices, degrading and inhuman 
reception conditions and expedited and discriminatory admissibility interviews occurring in the 
hotspots in Italy and Greece (ECRE, 2016; Danish Refugee Council, 2019). Hotspots have been 
criticised as an additional manifestation of EU containment policies attempting to establish an 
‘informal’ system of sub-standard asylum procedures operating at the borders, whose main 
objective is that of reducing and filtering access to international protection in the EU (Maiani 
2018: ECRE 2018b; Caritas Europa 2018; PICUM, 2017). 
Discussions on the possible establishment of ‘controlled centres’ have been additionally caught 
up on controversial issues that have prevented member states from finding an agreement on 
the reform of the CEAS, such as relocation of asylum seekers and the expanded use of so-called 
‘border procedures’ (European Commission, 2016a, 2016b). In the absence of a new common 
approach on responsibility sharing, frontline member states, including countries like Italy, have 
excluded the possibility of hosting ‘controlled centres’ on their territory, claiming that this 
would actually imply additional ‘structural burdens’ on their asylum systems and increase their 
responsibility over migrants and asylum seekers (ECRE, 2018a). Interestingly, despite the lack 
of clarity and consensus on what ‘uncontrolled centres’ were, the European Commission 
included them in the proposals on the reform of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) 
Agency presented in September 2018. The reference was finally scrapped from the 
                                                     
50See  https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/Comments/OL_OTH_64_2018.pdf 
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compromise text reached by the co-legislators in April 2019 upon request of the European 
Parliament.51 
The idea of establishing “regional disembarkation platforms” has also been the object of strong 
criticism. The possibility of disembarking individuals in distress at sea on the territory of a third 
country is conditional on the respect of legal obligations under international and EU law, 
including the principle of non-refoulment as codified in the Geneva Convention and other 
relevant provisions under the ECHR and the EU CFR (see Section 3 above; Carrera and Lannoo, 
2018). UNHCR and IOM have clearly identified a set of conditions that should underpin any 
cooperation approach to disembarkation following SAR operations in the Mediterranean. First, 
the determination of places of disembarkation should be carried out in a manner that ensures 
respect for human rights and the principle of non-refoulement.  
Second, people rescued at sea should be granted adequate, safe and dignified reception 
conditions and have access to asylum procedures in line with relevant international and 
national standards. Finally, arrangements with countries outside the EU should be coupled with 
clear commitments from the EU side to provide solutions for refugees, including resettlement 
and other forms of admission, such as expanded family reunification opportunities (UNHCR-
IOM, 2018). All these conditions make the various ‘policy options’ or ‘scenarios’ laid down by 
the European Commission non-paper on disembarkation platforms in Africa unfeasible.  
Stakeholders have opposed plans to disembark asylum seekers rescued at sea in North African 
countries, underlining a set of issues concerning the right to access protection and the 
treatment that asylum seekers would face in those countries. ECRE dismissed disembarkation 
in third countries as an ‘externalisation fantasy’, concluding that “in the absence of a 
functioning asylum system in any of the North African countries and for as long as they are not 
in place, disembarkation of those rescued on the high seas or in the SAR zone of Libya by vessels 
under an EU member state’s flag, by commercial or by NGOs vessels should take place in an EU 
member state” (ECRE 2018c). The already mentioned joint communication issued by UN Special 
Procedures (five UN Rapporteurs and two Working Groups) to the European institutions on 18 
September 201852 stated that  
Outsourcing responsibility of disembarkation to third countries, in particular those 
with weak protection systems, only increases the risk of refoulement and other 
human rights violations. As similar models have shown elsewhere, external 
disembarkation and processing centres do not provide durable solutions and result 
in numerous grave human rights violations, including breaches of the non-
refoulement obligation, torture and ill treatment, confinement amounting to 
arbitrary or indefinite detention, and violations of the right to life. 
                                                     
51 See Provisional agreement resulting from interinstitutional negotiations. Proposal for a regulation European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EU) n° 
1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (COM(2018)0631 – C8-0406/2018 – 2018/0330A(COD)). 
52 See https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/Comments/OL_OTH_64_2018.pdf 
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Major political and operational obstacles associated with involving third countries in 
disembarkation arrangements should also be underlined. Both the Commission and the Council 
have underlined the need to secure the agreement of third countries through financial and 
operational support, as well as resettlement pledges and other protection pathways (European 
Commission, 2018b; Council of the EU, 2018). African states’ reluctance to accept 
disembarkation of migrants rescued at sea on their territory clearly emerges from a common 
African Union (AU) position paper leaked to the press, which equates the establishment of 
disembarkation platforms in their territories to the creation of “de facto detention centres”, 
and calls on African states to refuse to cooperate with the EU in the implementation of those 
plans.53 
4.2 Ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements 
4.2.1. Ad hoc relocation arrangements explained  
In the background of these disagreements, since the summer of 2018, cases of disembarkation 
following SAR operations conducted by civil society and commercial vessels have been 
addressed through new instruments called ad hoc or “temporary” disembarkation and 
relocation arrangements.54 These ‘arrangements’ have in practice involved a small group of 
member states willing to relocate a share of disembarked asylum seekers in Spain, Italy and 
Malta (ECRE, 2019a). Apart from a few media articles, there has been very little public 
knowledge and disclosed information about them. Unlike the 2015 ‘temporary relocation 
decisions’,55 there is not any official document laying down the actual rules and procedures 
covering these arrangements. Interviews conducted for the purposes of this paper revealed 
that the member states concerned did not want to have any written record or bring any public 
accountability to the arrangements.  
                                                     
53 The Guardian, African Union seeks to kill EU plan to process migrants in Africa, 24 February 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa  
54  Ad hoc arrangements on disembarkation and relocation have been referred to in different ways in EU debates. 
The European Commission has referred to them as “temporary arrangements on disembarkation” (European 
Commission, 2019), a terminology that has also been followed in the context of debates conducted under the 
Romanian Presidency of the Council (Council of the EU, 2019). The same arrangements were also defined as 
“transitory measures” in a discussion paper prepared by the Romanian Presidency for an Informal meeting of the 
strategic committee on immigration, frontiers and asylum (SCIFA) held in Bucharest on March 2019 (Council of 
the EU, 2019b). While defining these arrangements as “temporary” or “transitory” points to the fact that they are 
limited in time and only apply to very specific situations, this terminology may be misleading in the absence of a 
clear indication of the period of time during which these arrangements will remain applicable. For the purposes 
of this paper, we chose to refer to them as Ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements.    
55 Council of the European Union (2015), “Resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council on relocating from Greece and Italy 40 000 persons in clear need of international 
protection”, 11131/15, ASIM 63, Brussels, 22 July (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11131-
2015-INIT/en/pdf); and Council of the European Union (2015), Council Decision establishing provisional measures 
in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, 12098/15, ASIM 87, Interinstitutional 
File: 2015/0209 (NLE), Brussels, 22 September (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12098-2015-
INIT/en/pdf). 
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The arrangements have mainly covered situations of migrants rescued in Libyan or 
international waters by civil society actor boats and for which there is no agreement between 
EU member states, notably between Italy and Malta, over who should take responsibility for 
disembarkation. The arrangements have been described as ‘ad hoc’ in nature, and have 
followed a boat-by-boat approach aimed at breaking political standoffs between governments 
forbidding or delaying disembarkation in their ports (ECRE 2019a). Table 2 below outlines the 
only existing publicly available information about the outputs of member state arrangements 
during the second half of 2018, which reveals a reduced number of people subject to 
relocations.56 
Table 2. Ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements (June – October 2018) 
Ship  Date  Port  DE  BE  ES  FR  IE  LU  NL  NO  PT  TOTAL 
Aquarius  17/06/18  Valencia, ES  -  -  -  78  -  -  -  -  -  78 
Lifeline  27/06/18  Valletta, MT  -  6  -  52  26  15  20  7  -  126 
Open Arms  09/08/18  Algeciras, ES  -  -  -  20  -  -  -  -  -  20 
Aquarius  15/08/18  Valletta, MT  50  -  60  60  17  5  -  -  30  222 
Aquarius  01/10/18  Valletta, MT  15  -  15  18  -  -  -  -  10  58 
TOTAL -  -  65  6  75  228  43  20  20  7  40  504 
Source: German Federal Ministry of Interior, Reply to parliamentary question by AfD, 19/6235, 3 December 2018, 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/062/1906235.pdf  
While often labelled as ‘practical’ or expressions of ‘pragmatism’ by some EU policymakers, 
their informal or extra-Treaty nature raises serious concerns regarding their compliance with 
EU asylum standards, EU Treaty principles and fundamental rights. Cases have been reported 
of asylum applicants disembarked in Malta who have been arbitrarily detained until their 
transfer to other member states, without allowing them the possibility to lodge an asylum 
claim. Similarly, it has been reported that persons disembarked in Spain have been subject to 
transfer procedures under relocation arrangements without prior registration of their asylum 
claim and without reception conditions in line with existing EU asylum law (ECRE, 2019a).  
During his State of the Union Speech of September 2018 former president of the European 
Commission Juncker made an indirect reference to the issue of ‘relocation arrangements’ by 
stating that “We cannot continue to squabble to find ad hoc solutions each time a new ship 
arrives. Temporary solidarity is not good enough. We need lasting solidarity – today and forever 
more.”57 The Commission then underlined the objective to move from ad hoc, temporary and 
limited solutions carried out in the previous months to the adoption of a “transparent step-by-
step work plan that would ensure that the Member State concerned receive the operational 
                                                     
56 As underlined by ECRE (2019a), the lack of publicly available information on ad hoc relocation arrangements 
does not allow adequate oversight of member states’ compliance with their relocation commitments in practice. 
57 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf page 7. 
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and effective assistance it needs from the Commission, EU agencies and other Member 
States”(European Commission, 2019).58 
Since early 2019, upon request from concerned member states, the European Commission has 
in some way been involved in the implementation of informal relocation arrangements after 
disembarkation and the development of a so-called ‘supportive platform for operational 
cooperation”.59 During an ‘exchange of views’ on "temporary arrangements” in the asylum 
policy” with the European Parliament LIBE Committee in February 2019,60 the Commission 
stated the need for an “organised form of coordination” and a “commonly agreed voluntary 
framework”. It mentioned recent cases in which the Commission was providing “coordination 
and assistance” to involve member states with the deployment of a representative on the 
ground, as well as financial support to the implementation of these arrangements through the 
EU budget and specifically the AMIF emergency funding (Article 18 of AMIF Regulation).  
This declaration notwithstanding, interviews conducted for this paper revealed that the 
Commission role should be better understood as that of a ‘facilitator’ or ‘deal broker’ in the 
context of member states pledging exercise. Upon request for assistance from a member state, 
either Italy or Malta, the Commission proceeds with putting together a group of EU member 
states interested or willing to make ‘pledges’ from those people disembarked. The voluntary 
nature of the system has meant that the implementation of arrangements has been based on 
the “good will” of participating member states. It has not helped clarifying the concrete 
circumstances justifying the triggering of these arrangements in the requesting Member States. 
Table 3 below provides an updated overview of the disembarkation and relocation 
arrangements implemented since the first half of 2019, which shows how these arrangements 
have involved only a limited number of disembarked persons.61  
                                                     
58 The Romanian Presidency of the Council has also tried to foster a commitment for a structured response to 
disembarkation through a “temporary arrangement on relocation” based on voluntary participation of member 
states. See intervention by Mr. Raducu-Catalin Burlacu Raducu Catalin Burlacu, representative of the Romanian 
Presidency at the LIBE Committee meeting “Exchange of views on "temporary arrangements” in the asylum 
policy”, 19.02.2019. Online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20190219-
1615-COMMITTEE-LIBE  
59 According to a Working Paper titled “Guidelines on Temporary Arrangements for Disembarkation” of 12 June 
2019 prepared by Romanian Presidency of the EU, the following actors participate in this ‘platform’: “Commission, 
the Presidency, the requesting Member State, participating Member States, relevant EU agencies, Council 
Secretariat”, Council of the EU (2019), Guidelines on Temporary Arrangements for Disembarkation, WK 7219/2019 
INIT, Brussels, 12 June 2019. 
60 Online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20190219-1615-COMMITTEE-LIBE 
61 The total number of disembarked persons relocated by participating member states is not publicly available for 
the relocation arrangements reported in the table.   
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Table 3. Ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements facilitated by the Commission 
and EU agencies (January – June 2019) 
Ship Date Place of disembarkation N° of people 
disembarked 
EU agencies 
involved 
Sea Watch 3 
and Sea-Eye 
‘Alan Kurdi’ 
(NGOs vessels) 
9.01.2019 La Valletta (Malta)  49 EASO 
Sea Watch 3  
(NGO vessel) 
31.01.2019 Catania (Italy) 47 EASO/FRONTEX 
Sea-Eye 
‘Alan Kurdi’  
(NGO vessel) 
13.04.2019 La Valletta (Malta) 62 EASO 
Stromboli  
(Italian naval 
ship) 
10.05.2019 Augusta (Italy) 36 EASO/FRONTEX 
Cigala Fulgosi  
(Italian naval 
ship) 
2.06.2019 Genoa (Italy) 100 EASO/FRONTEX 
Sources: Author’s interviews and media sources. 
EU agencies, chiefly EASO and Frontex, have been mobilised to provide support to member 
state authorities in dealing with specific procedural steps following the disembarkation of 
rescued persons, including first reception, registration of asylum applications, relocation and 
return. The role of Frontex in ad hoc disembarkation arrangements has only covered Italy. It 
has been mainly focused on conducting ‘hotspot-related tasks’, mainly identification and 
nationality determination, fingerprinting and registration of disembarked individuals in EU 
information systems such as Eurodac and Schengen Information System (SIS) II, upon request 
of concerned member states.  
EASO has played a more substantive role in both Malta and Italy. EASO’s support in the context 
of relocation arrangements is in practice formalised through a ‘bilateral exchange of letters’ 
with the requesting EU member state government, laying down the ‘terms’ of EASO support 
and providing the bases for EASO involvement in the arrangements. Through its involvement 
in relocation arrangements EASO is “operating in a grey zone”. This kind of activity is not 
reflected in its current mandate. EASO support has materialised in different activities for 
different countries involved in these arrangements since the beginning of 2019. These have 
often included, for instance, the provision of information on the international protection 
procedure, registration of applications for international protection for relocation purposes, 
support Member States’ delegations missions, the selection and matching processes of 
applicants (preparation of selection/matching lists).  
The matching process has also been heterogeneous and inconsistent, with no clear distribution 
key mechanism being applied. Our interviews revealed that since the beginning of 2019 the 
distribution criteria were applied in a “kind of matching system” where elements considered 
included family unity, or the family links of applicants with a specific country. EASO support 
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aimed at moving towards a “fairer and proportionate distribution” system among the 
participating governments when matching asylum applicants to specific states, in particular by 
allocating to each of the participating member states a proportional share of applicants with 
high and low recognition rates.62 This has been confirmed by a Working Paper titled “Guidelines 
on Temporary Arrangements for Disembarkation” of 12 June 2019 prepared by Romanian 
Presidency of the EU, according to which the composition of the ‘relocation pool’ is determined 
by “the indications by the Member States of relocation of the profiles that these Member States 
are willing to accept (variable geometry).”63 It remains unclear how the Commission’s and EASO 
involvement has prevented member states only accepting applicants from nationalities with 
high recognition rates, and avoiding the inherent discrimination  based on ‘cherry picking’ or 
‘first comes, first served basis’ practices.  
Our interviews revealed that some EU member states had expressed interest or “preferences” 
for specific “profiles” of applicants – such as specific nationalities, families or only those 
qualified as ‘vulnerable’. The exact implementation procedure of relocation arrangements was 
described by the Commission in terms of a ‘workflow’ or “step-by-step work plan that would 
ensure that the Member State concerned receives the operational and effective assistance it 
needs from the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States” (European Commission, 
2019). This notion, however, is in itself alien to any existing EU legal act and implies that the 
procedure remains outside any meaningful legal framework.  
The concept of ‘workflow’ has in practice meant that the Commission and EU agencies are only 
involved at very specific phases of the ‘workflow’, and are allowed by member states to perform 
only a weak role consisting of a limited number of well-defined tasks and preventing overall 
involvement and supervision. Yet, this does not exonerate them of chain responsibility for 
human rights violations resulting from the entire procedure. EASO is for instance not directly 
involved in the actual implementation of the relocation procedure, and the decision on who is 
to be relocated when, and where, which remains with the member states concerned. Neither 
are the Commission and EU agencies exercising any monitoring role on the extent to which 
Malta and Italy, or any of the receiving member states, are applying the guarantees envisaged 
in the EU Dublin Regulation, or the impacts of the arrangements on the rights of asylum 
seekers, including non-discrimination.64  
                                                     
62 EASO, Request for Access to Document (No. 03753), EASO/ED/2019/283, Valetta, 14 June 2019. The answer to 
this Request did not include information on the total number of applicants relocated by Member States involved. 
In the case of disembarkation of 47 people by the NGO Sea Watch 3 on 31 January 2019 reported in Table 3, seven 
member states contributed to the relocation of a total of 30 people: France, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Portugal and Romania (EASO, 2019). 
63 Council of the EU (2019a), Guidelines on Temporary Arrangements for Disembarkation, WK 7219/2019 INIT, 
Brussels, 12 June 2019. The Guidelines also foresee that Member States willing to relocate voluntarily will receive 
a lump sum of 6000 EUR per applicant, in line with the amended Article 18 of the AMIF Regulation 516/2014. 
64 The ‘arrangements’ have covered a different personal scope to the one applicable in the temporary relocation 
procedure adopted and implemented since 2015. The assumption in that former procedure was that the 
individuals concerned would receive international protection in the EU member state of destination based on 
nationalities with a high recognition rate, mainly Syrians and Eritreans, and for some time Iraqis. The persons 
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The contributions by the European Commission and EU agencies since the beginning of 2019 
has not helped in bringing full legal certainty to the operationalisation of relocation 
arrangements. The procedure has remained intergovernmental and characterised by a high 
level of informality and lack of transparency. Arrangements have been designed in a way that 
makes it impossible to fully guarantee that EU asylum acquis standards are complied with by 
EU member state authorities across the various phases comprising the ‘workflow’.  
To remedy some of these deficiencies, human rights organisations called on EU governments 
to establish, as an interim measure, a predictable arrangement or ‘mechanism’ for 
disembarking and relocating people rescued at sea among member states (Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, 2019; ECRE, 2019a; Council of Europe, 2019). They also 
recommended that relocation of asylum seekers rescued at sea should fully comply with the 
CEAS rules and make sure that disembarked people are granted access to an asylum procedure 
and adequate reception conditions, and that the transfers should be carried out in accordance 
with the Dublin Regulation. The exact scope of these proposals is not clear and depending on 
their exact legal nature, they may entail a number of profound risks.   
4.2.2. Differentiated integration in EU asylum policy: lasting or unequal solidarity?  
Ad hoc disembarkation and relocation arrangements could be seen as an instance of flexible 
and ‘differentiated integration’ in EU asylum policy (De Witte, Ott and Vos, 2017). However, 
the extent to which ‘flexible integration’ in the area of asylum and relocation may further the 
objectives of the EU and reinforce the integration process in this area remains doubtful. The 
EU Treaties clearly talk about the development of a common EU asylum policy and a uniform 
status of asylum valid throughout the Union (Article 78.1 and 78.2 TFEU). Informal or even 
formalised ‘variable geometry’ in this domain, with a small group of member states cooperating 
among themselves, would put at risk the objective of the Treaties of having a single and unique 
area of asylum common to all EU member states (which are also members of the Schengen 
system). It would also pose fundamental challenges to the effective and equal implementation 
of existing EU asylum acquis across the Union. 
While it is true that European cooperation in the framework of the Schengen and Dublin 
systems started in an intergovernmental fashion with the involvement of only a few EU 
member states, it is crucial to remind ourselves that, almost three decades later, policies in the 
areas of border control and asylum have been to a very large extent ‘Europeanised’ and brought 
under the Community framework, with the EU exercising either shared or exclusive legal 
competence. Proposals for flexible integration or ‘solidarity à la carte’ in these fields would be 
turning the clock back three decades and re-injecting nationalism and intergovernmentalism 
into fields that are now – despite their current deficiencies and limits – clearly under an EU 
remit.  
                                                     
involved were relocated as ‘asylum applicants’ and the actual asylum procedure took place in the country 
destination. 
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It is therefore central to give very careful consideration to what the current proposals for  
enhanced cooperation or any new “mechanism” or “solidarity pact” among a “coalition of the 
willing” (ECRE, 2019b; Vignon, 2019)65 in the field of asylum would actually mean in light of EU 
law and the Treaties, as well as to its longer-term implications for EU asylum and border 
policies. Policy ideas driven by ‘flexibility’ and ‘pragmatism’ in this area may seem attractive at 
first sight but, when examined in detail, they in fact raise profound questions regarding the 
challenges that they pose to the very consistency of the foundations and principles of the CEAS, 
as well as more generally the respect of the rule of law laid down in the EU Treaties, including 
the safeguarding of the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation. This principle, which is 
anchored in Article 4.3 TEU, requires member states to facilitate the achievement of the 
Union's tasks and to refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union's objectives. It also entails European institutions not affecting the principle of inter-
institutional balance by fully complying with their attributed roles in the Treaties (Klamert, 
2014). 
The enactment of a flexible approach would risk ending up in the establishment of competing 
areas and dispersed levels of Europeanisation and integration of EU asylum policy, preventing 
equal treatment and a uniform status of asylum seekers throughout the EU as stipulated in Art. 
78.2.a TFEU. A ‘multi-speed’ EU would risk a fast reversal of Europeanisation in asylum policy. 
It could also lead to the establishment of different ‘areas of asylum’ in the EU and put at stake 
the political project of having a unique Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which is 
guaranteed across the Union. Research has shown how the use of variable geometry in the 
context of ‘opt-out’ clauses granted to Denmark, has allowed the Danish government to 
introduce international protection standards that are below those provided by EU asylum law 
(Walter-Franke, 2019). 
“Ever changing ‘flexibility’ can reach a degree of complexity that may paralyse the everyday 
cooperation of national authorities” (Carrera and Geyer, 2007). While flexibility may overcome 
obstacles posed by some member states when moving forward in supranational cooperation, 
it may bring about risks of parallel and even competing ‘areas’ across the Union, which will add 
to increasing dispersion, legal uncertainty and fragmentation in European integration (Carrera 
and Guild, 2015). Differentiated integration would also allow some member states to lower 
existing EU and international standards and to go ahead in establishing ‘coalitions of the 
unwilling’.  
The use of enhanced cooperation as foreseen in the EU Treaties would not be a panacea for EU 
asylum policy either, as the establishment in 2017 of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO) has shown well (Carrera, 2018).66 It took four and half years of long and arduous 
                                                     
65 See, for instance, Vignon, J. (2019). For a European Policy on Asylum, Migration and Mobility, Jacques Delors 
Institute. The report calls for the creation of “... a new solidarity pact between a group of voluntary Member States 
and the others, especially those at the external borders”. 
66 The European Parliament and the Council (2017) Directive 2017/1731 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ 
L198/29, 28.7.2107 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L1371&from=EN). 
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negotiations before formal adoption of this instrument under enhanced cooperation. The 
original proposal presented by the Commission in 2013 was significantly watered-down inside 
the Council “rooms”. Member states that have not participated in the EPPO, such as Hungary,67 
still had the possibility to participate in the negotiations of the mandate and negatively affect 
its final shape in ways that have been considered to challenge the overall EU value-added and 
overall effectiveness of the current EPPO model (Mitsilegas and Giuffrida, 2017). Moreover, as 
Peers (2018) has underlined, until present the use of enhanced cooperation has been minor 
and mainly confined to fields subject to unanimity voting. During the previous legislature, a 
logic of ‘consensus’ or de facto unanimity drove negotiations on the CEAS reform files inside 
the Council and the European Council. This was the case in spite of the qualified majority voting 
rule formally foreseen in the EU Treaties under the ordinary legislative procedure and the 
existence of clear indications that a large group of member states exceeding qualified majority 
were in favour of engaging with the European Parliament in the negotiations of the CEAS 
reform package. 68 Such a political choice is not in compliance with the decision-making rules 
on asylum in the Treaties and violates the principle of sincere cooperation among European 
institutions 
The principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty is not 
a pick and choose or ‘à la carte’ option for national governments and their ministries of interior. 
It implies equality among all EU member states and that a common EU response to that 
common challenge should be prioritised and preferred (Carrera and Lannoo, 2018). This 
understanding of the EU principle of solidarity as “equal solidarity” – whereby responsibility is 
upheld and equally shared among all Schengen countries – was reflected in the ruling by the 
Court of Justice of the EU in the judgement on relocation quotas against Hungary and 
Slovakia.69 The Court emphasised that “When one or more Member States are faced with an 
“emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries” (Art. 
78.3 TFEU), the responses “must, as a rule, be divided between all the other Member States, in 
accordance with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the 
Member States, since, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU, that principle governs EU asylum 
policy”. 
                                                     
67 So far, 22 member states are participating in the EPPO. The following EU countries do not take part in the EPPO: 
Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland and Hungary. 
68 European Parliament, Letter by Claude Moraes (Former Chair of the LIBE Committee in the European 
Parliament) to Permanent Representation of Austria before the EU, 3 December 2018, IPOL-COM-LIBE D(2018) 
46538 (in possession of the authors), which stated that “… in last week’s coreper (sic) meeting the Presidency 
decided to the texts on the updated mandates prepared at technical level by the Council Presidency and to refer 
them back to technical level for further drafting despite clear indications that a large number of Member States 
exceeding qualify (sic) majority were in favour of reengaging in negotiations with the Parliament on the basis of 
the proposed texts… I would like to recall that Articles 16.3 TEU, 78.2 and 294 TFEU read in combination provide 
that decisions fall under ordinary legislative procedure and must be taken in Council by qualified majority. These 
rules need to be respected to allow for decisions to be taken in an area of great importance for European citizens 
and to ensure the principle of sincere cooperation among institutions”. 
69 See Judgment in Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Press and Information Slovakia and Hungary v Council 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-09/cp170091en.pdf 
SEARCH AND RESCUE, DISEMBARKATION AND RELOCATION ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN | 31 
 
5. Conclusions: equal solidarity 
This paper has underlined how the highly politicised and long-standing debates on SAR and 
disembarkation among some EU member states continue preventing sustainable, common and 
principled policy responses ensuring international protection standards and preventing deaths 
in the Mediterranean. The multi-layered legal framework governing SAR and disembarkation 
provides, however, a set of obligations upon member state governments, including the 
absolute and non-derogable commitment to preventing loss of lives at sea, and a due diligence 
duty to coordinate effective and timely SAR responses and guarantee international protection 
and non-refoulement of rescued people. Member states are not free to tactically choose not to 
save lives at sea or disembark people to safety or to evade their own legal responsibilities under 
EU and national constitutional law when cooperating with third countries. Current contained 
mobility policies in the EU are unlawful and illegitimate. They stand in violation of relevant EU 
and international human rights instruments and unlock accountability and liability for grave 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity. 
European institutions should resist arguments based on the current impasse in the reform of 
the EU Dublin system, as excuses by some member state governments and ministries of interior 
to avoid complying with their obligations under international, regional, EU and constitutional 
fundamental rights standards. Under no circumstances should member state disagreements 
allow for continuing to put the lives and safety of people rescued at sea in jeopardy.70 
Relocation arrangements among a few EU member states for people disembarked in the 
Mediterranean have in fact entailed ‘less EU’ and damaged the furthering of European 
integration in the CEAS, and its reform. Ideas to pursue ‘coalitions of the willing’ or ‘solidarity 
pacts’ among a reduced group of governments to foster variable solidarity in the field of asylum 
may at first sight be attractive, but they bring major risks poisoning the sustainability and 
consistency of the CEAS and the Schengen system. They may also bring Europeanisation 
‘backwards’ in the areas of asylum and Schengen by setting up differing and competing areas 
of solidarity inside the Union. 
States and the ICC Prosecutor should fully investigate the complicity of EU agents and the Italian 
government, and the direct and indirect consequences of contained mobility policies, on crimes 
against humanity affecting migrants in Libya. Relevant international justice venues dealing with 
law of the sea disputes could be also involved. The European Commission and the European 
Parliament should make sure that all EU member states fully and effectively comply with their 
commitments under international maritime, refugee and human rights standards and EU law. 
Current responsibilities must be upheld. Efficient and timely enforcement of current standards 
– including infringement proceedings by the Commission – should become a clear priority 
during the next legislature. The EU counts with sound legal competences in the areas of border 
surveillance in the Schengen Borders Code and access to international protection and reception 
                                                     
70 Council of Europe (2019), which states that “Further resolution of questions about responsibility for the 
reception and processing of rescued migrants should take place after disembarkation, rather than leaving rescued 
migrants stuck without a place of safety.” 
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conditions in existing EU directives composing the CEAS. There is also a common set of legal 
standards on SAR and disembarkation applying in the context of Frontex-led maritime joint 
operations, which constitute ‘benchmarks’ when assessing the legality of current member state 
practices. These EU standards make unlawful any indirect forms of cooperation and sharing of 
information with North African countries to carry out ‘pullbacks’.  
No EU member state should be permitted to police or criminalise civil society actors involved 
in SAR or humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean. Such actions constitute an illegitimate 
restriction of the fundamental right of freedom of association enshrined in Article 11 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the independence of human rights defenders safeguarded 
by the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. The criminalisation of NGOs constitutes a 
major threat to the EU’s founding values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, which lay at the very basis 
of mutual-trust cooperation in the EU. The current EU legal framework on migrant smuggling 
should be amended to include an obligation for member states not to criminalise humanitarian 
assistance to asylum seekers and irregular immigrants (Carrera et a. 2019b). 
Current ad hoc and ‘informal’ disembarkation and relocation arrangements supported and 
coordinated by the European Commission and EASO since early 2019 constitute extra-Treaty 
and intergovernmental initiatives standing at odds with EU principles. As guardian of the 
Treaties, the European Commission should only support initiatives unequivocally falling within 
EU remits of action, so that any administrative cooperation among member states takes place 
in the scope of protection standards envisaged in EU law. Any joint actions should fall within 
the scope of the Treaties and engage the whole EU decision-making process and the principle 
of EU inter-institutional balance, subject to full scrutiny by the European Parliament and the 
Court of Justice of the EU. EASO and Frontex should be only involved in activities which fall 
within the scope of their official mandates, and in supporting the coordination of member state 
initiatives which are asylum acquis and fundamental rights-proof. All the relevant information 
on the workings, outcomes and outputs of these arrangements should be brought to the 
attention of the wider public. There should be an independent investigation into the operability 
and actual results of these arrangements, as well as their impacts on asylum seeker rights. 
As a consequence of the ‘package approach’ linking the approval of the recast Dublin 
Regulation to all the other CEAS legislative instruments under negotiation, the whole reform of 
EU asylum rules has been put on hold. The decision-making rules and procedures in the Lisbon 
Treaty (QMV) should be re-applied and the ‘package approach’ abandoned.  
Pending a comprehensive reform of the Dublin system, member states may decide to take up 
responsibility to assess an application for international protection, even if they are not 
responsible following the Dublin Regulation criteria based on the “humanitarian clause” 
foreseen by Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation (‘Discretionary Clauses’). Based on all the 
challenges identified in this paper about the disembarkation and relocation arrangements, any 
new relocation system linked to disembarkation in the Mediterranean should, however, take 
place under a clear EU remit and be strictly linked to the swift adoption of the proposed 
reformed of the Dublin Regulation. The setting up of a permanent corrective (relocation) 
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mechanism for sharing responsibility on asylum applicants should not be à la carte but involve 
all EU member states (European Parliament, 2017). The guiding principle should be one of 
‘equal solidarity’, whereby all EU member states share fairly and equally the responsibility over 
asylum seekers across the Union in full compliance with EU constitutive principles and 
fundamental rights.  
The politics of criminalisation and disengagement in SAR operational capacities in the 
Mediterranean, and the EU indirect cooperation and support to Libyan Coast Guard actors to 
carry out unlawful ‘pullbacks’, has resulted in an increase in the number of lives lost at sea, 
grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity. EU policies of containment as well 
as those of discouragement and indifference on SAR should be abandoned. Instead, the EU 
should reconsider the feasibility of setting up a new SAR joint operation in the Mediterranean 
(European Parliament, 2015 2016, 2018b; UNHCR, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). EU 
agencies, such as Frontex and EASO, could be assigned to coordinating and supporting tasks in 
different phases of the proposed EU SAR Joint Operation (Carrera and Lannoo, 2018).71 Any 
future operational support should be focused on SAR and safeguarding international protection 
of people rescued at sea.  
EU funding instruments must not be used as an attempt to bypass the Treaties, national 
constitutions and international commitments. The EU should stop funding migration 
management-driven training and ‘incapacity building’ on SAR and border maritime surveillance 
in unsafe third countries such as Libya through EU Trust Funds. These activities are illegal and 
incompatible with the above-mentioned standards, which bind the European institutions and 
agencies. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) should carry out an investigation into the ways 
in which the EU Trust Fund for Africa has supported the activities of the Italian ministry of 
interior with regard to “strengthening capacity of Libyan authorities on search and rescue” and 
“tackling irregular border crossings” and internationally wrongful acts.72 The EU could establish 
an EU SAR fund to help reinforce a coordinated EU SAR response (European Parliament, 2018b), 
and to strengthen EU member state disembarkation capacities, reception facilities and 
domestic asylum systems. 
We cannot close our ears to the deadly effects and human rights and rule of law violations 
emerging from current contained mobility policies in the EU. For the Union to safeguard its 
legitimacy and continue justifying its value added, these principles must be non-negotiable and 
always come first. A common EU response involving all Schengen members in the spirit of equal 
solidarity should be the way forward.  
                                                     
71 EU agencies must rigorously comply with international, regional and EU fundamental rights and refugee 
standards, and be subject to a robust and impartial monitoring and independent complaint mechanism (in addition 
to the one operated by the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer) before the European Ombudsman, in cooperation 
with existing national complaint mechanism bodies (Carrera and Stefan, 2018). 
72 See “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya” https://ec.europa.eu/ 
trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-first-
phase_en and https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/partner/italian-ministry-interior_en 
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List of abbreviations 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
ARSIWA Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
CAT UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
CEAS Common European Asylum System  
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
COM European Commission 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
DG Directorate General 
EASO European Asylum Support Office 
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard 
ECA European Court of Auditors 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
EUCFR EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
EUNAVFOR-MED European Union’s Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation ‘Sophia’ 
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance system 
EUTF EU Trust Fund 
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
FRONTEX EU External Borders Agency (see also EBCG) 
HOME  DG Migration and Home Affairs  
HR/VP 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and Vice-President of the European 
Commission 
ICC  International Criminal Court  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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IMO International Maritime Organisation  
IOM International Organization for Migration  
ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
LIBE Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, European Parliament 
MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
QMV Qualified Majority Voting 
SAR Search and Rescue at Sea 
SBC Schengen Borders Code 
SRR Search and Rescue Region  
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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